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ABSTRACT
AMBIVALENT MODERNITY: SCIENTISTS IN FILM AND THE PUBLIC EYE
SEPTEMBER 2010
STACY EVANS, B.A., WELLESLEY COLLEGE
M.P.P., KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor N. J. Demerath, III
Scientists are widely regarded as high status individuals, who are smarter 
than the vast majority of the population. Science holds a very high status as a 
discipline, both within and outside of academe. This notwithstanding, popular 
stereotypes of scientists are often highly negative, with the image of the socially 
inept or even mad scientist being commonplace. This apparent contradiction is 
worth exploring. Additionally, we see the label scientific being used to justify 
pseudoscience and other results that are flatly contradicted by the bulk of 
scientific research (e.g., links between vaccines and autism). This is not due, as 
some argue, only or even primarily to a lack of understanding of science. 
Ultimately, there are two "sciences": science defined by the scientific 
methodology of the scientists, and the broader cultural use of science as a truth-
teller without real use of scientific methodology. This dichotomy is wrapped up in
both the nature of modernity and the idea of post-modernity. This research uses 
a content analysis of film to examine the nature of stereotypical portrayals of 
scientists, and a factor analysis of NSF survey data to investigate the complex 
attitudes towards science and scientists.  
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CHAPTER 1
SCIENCE AS METHODOLOGY VS. SCIENCE AS RITUAL:
COMPETING UNDERSTANDING
Scientists are different - at least in the way they understand science. To a 
scientist, science is a methodology, a process, a system for getting the best 
possible answers to empirical questions. To the rest of society, science is much 
more and to some extent much less. Science is an ideology, a belief, not really 
about empirical questions, but definitely about truth. This is not to say that the 
general non-scientist public has no understanding of the underpinnings of 
science. However, science has become much more than a methodology. It has 
become a representation of modernity, of power, of access to knowledge, of 
perceived superiority. Science and scientists mean more to society than the 
knowledge they produce. They have become entangled with the way we think 
about the entire way we live. It isn't as simple as a person working on a problem. 
The social conception - the idea of the scientist and of science - is much larger 
than that.
Science is inherently mixed up with these broader issues because it maintains 
a high status position as purveyor of truth. We believe scientists (except when we 
don't) when they make a proclamation (more so when it fulfills our own current 
belief system). However, we also respond to scientists the way the rest of a class 
responds to the smart kid in class who makes an error, other kids are quick to 
correct, to laugh, to feel somewhat better, and to ultimately knock the smart kid 
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down the ladder closer to their own position. Fundamentally, as a society that 
values individualism highly, we don't like people who know more than we do. We 
also don't like a discipline that tells us some of our deeply held beliefs are wrong. 
After years of teaching sociology, I am still frequently surprised at the anger that 
emanates from my students when an inconvenient fact conflicts with a deeply 
held belief about how the world works. Students will often argue simply, "No, 
that is wrong." Science tells people that the world is not always the way they want
it to be.
Science runs into even more problems because it does not always get the 
answer right on the first try. Those who work in science know that it takes a while
to settle a particular issue, to answer a question, or more frequently set of 
questions, that one study is generally not enough, that it may be able to examine 
only a piece of the puzzle. When reported through the distorting lens of the mass 
media, this tendency seems capricious. "Are pomegranates good for me or not?" 
Because the real complexity of the science does not get reported, those 
consuming the news can feel manipulated and wronged by later corrections. 
Clearly science does not know all.
Even so, when pseudo-scientific theories are put forth, they frequently use the
perceived methods of science. Measurements are taken, statistics are given, and if
you can get a credentialed scientist on your side, even better. So, when science 
looks at pseudoscience and declares it as such it looks like sour grapes. "Those 
scientists don't like this (ESP, Bigfoot, UFOs) because they are too closed-
minded." Every article or TV segment about a rebel scientist who struggled on 
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alone against all odds adds to this. We like stories about likable individuals who 
work outside of mainstream science and triumph. This resonates with our 
frontier nature, our societal myths about the lone struggle for success, the person 
who succeeds despite the ridicule of the wider scientific community. Clearly the 
institution of science is bad. 
In this way, science has also become attached to notions of what is wrong with
modernity. Pollution, bad food (genetically modified or filled with chemical 
preservatives), anything negative that comes from technology, can be seen as the 
result of science gone wrong. Our myths and tales from Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein on contain many examples of science gone wrong, often through 
the arrogance of the scientist who takes on the perceived anti-human perspective 
of science, ignoring ethical or moral or humanistic issues in a blind pursuit of 
some irrelevant truth. 
Simultaneously and paradoxically, society asks science to fix the problems it 
has created. This is not thrusting responsibility back upon the offending party, 
but a true belief in science that co-exists with our suspicion of it. As in the case of 
the smart kid, we laugh at mistakes to balance the perceived status differential, 
but then beg for help with our homework. This is not to say that science has never
had any negative outcomes. However, this societal belief goes beyond a careful 
consideration of the real negative outgrowths of science.
For the most part we accept, even welcome science into our lives. We want the
technological outgrowths of science  - the better health, the great toys, the newest 
computer - and we expect science to always give us more, better, faster. Yet, we 
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also blame science for many of the negative aspects of our society. We worry 
about genetic engineering in plants and humans, we blame preservatives in our 
food for various health complaints,  We see science as a destructive influence and 
scientists as disconnected from society and the emotions that would make them 
fully human.
Ultimately, science is regarded as more powerful by the broader society than 
by scientists themselves. It is a belief about our ability to find truth not just for 
empirical questions, but for everything. Simultaneously, it also viewed as a 
status-driven, fatally flawed institution that is deeply undemocratic. As a result, 
science as culture is not wholly amenable to change via education. The science of 
the classrooms is separate from the science that is part of day to day life. 
Problems with specific scientific topics  can be better managed through particular
educational interventions, but the general concept of science, because it is tied up
in wider cultural issues, will be a much more intransigent subject.
This allows us to believe in science and ghosts, to ignore results that are 
inconvenient, and to ask for more answers from those whom we criticize. 
Ultimately, science does not have one reputation even for one person. Like any 
broad cultural concept it is fuzzy, messy, and self-contradictory. This description 
could be used by scientists themselves, but it would have a very different 
meaning. For the scientist the discussion revolves around methods, results, and 
the nature of the people using and producing them. The cultural conception 
refers to an amorphous, abstract idea that is only connected to the real process 
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and product at small moments as specific topics arise. It is for many a metaphor 
rather than a real practice.
Literature
One of the most active areas of research on science and the public centers 
around the public understanding of science.  This field is primarily directed 
towards understanding who is scientifically literate in the general population, 
why, and what can be done to improve scientific literacy. This issue was 
important enough that the British Royal Society (1985) published a report 
regarding what should be done to improve public scientific literacy. A public 
statement regarding that report (1986), quoting the original, describes the central
issue for this branch of research quite succinctly: "Would the world be a better, or
even a different place if the public understood more of the scope and the 
limitations, the findings and the methods of science?" The British Royal Society 
answers a resounding "yes" to that question and, in a new report, describes how 
public understanding might be improved and who should be directly involved in 
that effort.
This type of call to improve the public understanding of science generally 
includes three approaches for doing so: improved education, improved media 
coverage, and increased public communication by scientists. These calls have 
been refined and restated (The Royal Society, 2008, 2000) Each of these three 
spawns an area of research seeking the proper methods for reaching that goal. 
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Some research has followed this model directly. These studies use relatively 
simple measures of science knowledge related to attitudes towards science.  The 
measures include roughly ten to twenty questions, usually multiple choice, 
regarding facts such as the period of rotation of the earth, the relative speed of 
light and sound, and the evolutionary connection between humans and animals. 
(Durant et al., 1989, Evans, 1995, Miller, 1983, Miller, 1998, Miller, 2004, Moore,
1998).
Not surprisingly, issues have been raised regarding the construction of the 
entire enterprise. Sturgis and Allum (2004) point out that most of the work on 
the public understanding of science has been based on a deficit model. This 
model assumes that the public does not have enough scientific knowledge, which 
in turn leads them to doubt the value of science and be suspicious of 
technological advancements. 
The field has debated the meaning of "public understanding of science" 
vigorously. One central issue has been the proper measurement of scientific 
literacy. Most studies use some form of knowledge question scale that is based on
ten to twenty multiple-choice questions. These questions range from whether the 
earth goes around the sun to the relative size of electrons and atoms to how lasers
work. They also can include, as does the NSF data used for this research 
(National Science Board, 2002), knowledge questions that are at the heart of the 
religion/science debate on evolution. For example, the NSF data includes 
questions  about whether dinosaurs lived at the same time as humans and 
whether human beings developed from earlier species of animals. These 
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questions can be criticized as indicators (e.g., Bauer, 1996, Pardo and Calvo, 
2002, Pardo and Calvo, 2004), but they have remained in widespread use. 
Some have argued that the popular knowledge questions need only better 
statistical techniques to analyze them (Miller, 1998). Others add new variables to 
the mix. Bauer, Petkova and Byadijeva (2000) argue that to truly analyze public 
understanding of science any analysis must include the degree to which people 
understand the workings of scientific institutions (Locke, 2001). Pardo and Calvo 
(2002) question the value of the attitudinal scales constructed from  the 
European Union's semi-annual survey (Eurobarometer) data. These scales cover 
items ranging from whether science will improve technology to whether scientists
are dangerous due to the knowledge they possess. The authors argue that the 
scales are at best weak indicators of attitudes regarding science, and 
consequently do not allow for a real understanding of the link between 
knowledge of science and attitudes towards it.
Others  have questioned the manner in which the boundaries of the discourse 
have been drawn.  Myers (2003) questions what is included as discussion of 
science and the relevant participants (scientists, media, lay people). There is also 
the issue of directionality of the discourse (Hilgartner, 1990): does the 
conversation only move from scientists to lay people?  Michael (2002) argues 
that understanding of science is really only a part of understanding how 
knowledge is constructed in a much wider sense. In other words, we cannot 
understand public understanding of knowledge without understanding public 
understanding of everything.
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The research has also been criticized (Dickson, 2000, Irwin and Wynne, 
1996) for its assumption that distrust of science and technology is necessarily due
to a lack of understanding, rather than valid concerns about the potential 
negative outcomes of science and technology. Due to this newer research and 
thinking (Miller, 2001), the House of Lords has asked that the enterprise be 
broadened to constitute a dialog about science, rather than focusing only on 
improvement of the knowledge of the lay public.
Despite the forgoing, there has been no real consideration of  the image of the 
scientist. Occasionally, questions of image are included as an introduction  to 
other issues (e.g. Nisbet et al., 2002), but even when the negative image 
embedded in popular culture is decried it is not empirically investigated. In fact, 
scientists are often called to become more involved in public discourse about 
science as a remedy (The Royal Society, 1986, Schnabel, 2003, van der Vink, 
1997) and only rarely is the problematic public image of the scientist included as 
a consideration (Garfield, 1987, LaFollette, 1999). These discussions are 
prescriptive rather than analytical. However, most authors who have expanded 
on the initial knowledge measurement mode of the public understanding of 
science, (e.g., Dickson, 2000, Godin and Gingras, 2000, Hilgartner, 1990, Irwin 
and Wynne, 1996, Irwin and Wynne, 1996, Michael, 2002, Myers, 2003, Sturgis 
and Allum, 2004)  ignore the public image of the scientist.
A second relevant field is a (mostly disconnected) literature that examines the
image of the scientist in the media. Studies of film and fiction representations of 
scientists are generally more literary than sociological, and often are limited in 
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either scope or methodology. Even so, none of the studies (Hirsch, 1958, Jones, 
1997, Landy, 1993, Skal, 1998, Sobchack, 1997, Terzian and Grunzke, 2007) find 
much that is positive about the representation of scientists. Stereotypes do vary, 
but the variation is limited. They range from the knowledge-hungry evil scientist 
who ruins the world to the inept bungler who may inadvertently help or may 
harm.
I will deal with this literature and how my own research on scientists in films 
differ from it in Chapter two. Meanwhile, one example of this phenomenon 
comes from Weingart, (2003), who examined two hundred and twenty-two films 
for various aspects of the representation of science and scientists. Even where 
scientists are portrayed as relatively benevolent, they were likely to be 
manipulated by outside interests that take advantage of their naivete. Goldman  
(Goldman, 1989) concluded that most movies show suspicion towards technology
and present it to a large degree as anti-human. Comstock and Tully (1985) 
examined technological innovation as a major theme and found that the 
innovator (forty percent of innovators were scientists) tends to be a loner and is 
as likely to be harmed as to be left unharmed by their own innovation. They 
found that forty percent of the films showed acts of innovation as harmful to 
others, thirty percent showed positive consequences and the remaining were 
neither positive or negative. Technology and science are often dealt with as if they
are interchangeable in film which reflects the popular conflation of the two. 
Finally, Weart’s (1988) interpretive investigation of movies, television, 
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government reports, literature and newspaper finds that the stereotype of the 
scientist is that of a dangerous individual who may also be mad. 
These negative stereotypes are softened when we move to an examination of 
television. Gerbner (1987) found that scientists on television are generally 
positively portrayed, but they are less positively portrayed than other professions.
Thus, one out of five scientists are portrayed negatively, compared to one out of 
nineteen doctors, and one out of forty law enforcers. They are also more likely to 
fail: one out of two scientists, compared to one out of five doctors and one out of 
eight law enforcement personnel. Finally, they are the most likely to kill (5%) or 
be killed (10%). It is remarkable that scientists are more likely to kill than police. 
They are shown as stronger and smarter but also as the least sociable of the 
professions. Finally, while they are not portrayed as the stereotypical mad 
scientist, their image is somewhat foreboding and “touched with a sense of evil, 
trouble, and peril” (p. 112).
Beyond acting as a lead in to research on public understanding of science, 
these studies are not integrated into that literature. One study attempted to 
connect television or media viewing to the perception of science (Nisbet et al., 
2002) but it focused on the image of science rather than the image of scientists.
Finally, there is a third body of literature that does deal with the public image 
of scientists outside of the media but, it is almost entirely disconnected from the 
previous two. This work attempts to assess the stereotypes that students in the 
public education system hold. It starts with Mead and Métraux’s (1957) study of 
high school students’ perceptions of scientists that found many negative 
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stereotypes exist. For example, scientists neglect their families, have no social 
life, and may not believe in God. Conversely, they also found positive stereotypes 
that include hard work, patience, open-mindedness, and dedication. 
Building on this research, the Chambers’ Draw-A-Scientist Test (Chambers, 
1983) and repeated use of this instrument (Barman, 1997, Barman, 1999, Bowtell,
1996, Demeis et al., 1993, Fung, 2002, Lannes et al., 1998, McDuffie, 2001, 
Newton and Newton, 1992) finds that stereotypical representation of the physical
aspects of scientists develops at an early age.  These studies, however, are limited.
Little is said about the limits of drawing as a real indicator of a student's 
perception of scientists, and the implication of what is included in the drawing is 
often exaggerated. For example, much is made of the fact that scientists are most 
often shown alone.  However, the standard prompt for the exercise ("Will you 
please draw a picture of a scientist doing science?") predisposes the subject to 
draw a single scientist. Additionally, this body of work assumes that there is a 
direct connection between ameliorating this stereotypical image of scientists and 
improving science education, without citing any evidence to support this 
assertion.
All three of these literatures could benefit from the others. However, direct 
integration is unlikely since the levels of rigor of the three vary highly and each 
speaks to different audiences.  Schibeci and Lee (2003) do attempt to make a 
clear connection between the three literatures, but do not go beyond positing (but
not testing for) a correlation between images of scientists, education, and the 
public understanding of science. Even within the public understanding of science 
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literature there are areas that do not truly intersect. Ultimately, each assumes at 
least some of what the others are still investigating. Hence, the media image of 
scientists is currently a bogey man within the literature, whose job it is to scare 
people into worrying about how the public sees science. Similarly, the public 
interpretation of the stereotyped image of scientists is ignored by those who look 
at the media. Finally, the educational literature puts together practices that 
assume that the connection between images of scientists and science knowledge 
are understood. 
All three discussions have some value, but all need to connect the image of the
scientist to knowledge of science. Ultimately, all three literatures see science as a 
reasonably well contained sphere that is separable from society. Science in these 
models has clear boundaries, actors, and topics. Knowledge of science can be 
measured clearly (even if it is not done well now), and attitudes can be directly 
attached to the thing that is science. 
Some analyses do bring in a notion of culture similar to Snow's  (1959) Two 
Cultures.  Godin and Gingras (2000) provide a useful reconceptualization of the 
problem of public understanding of science along this line. They argue that the 
current model is limited in that it does not take account of science's position 
within the wider culture. Their new model allows for both an individual and a 
social perspective as dimensions within scientific culture. However, their 
conceptualization is based on the diffusion of science from scientists to other 
groups. It does not allow for a notion of science that is disconnected from the 
production of science by scientists. (Gregory and Miller, 2000, Kirejczyk, 1999, 
12
Raza et al., 2002). Hence, the discussion revolves around bringing the general 
public into the culture of science. This leads back to the same discussions and 
solutions that plague the earlier PUS (Public Understanding of Science) 
discussions, although with an added level of sophistication. The solution to lack 
of scientific understanding and appreciation is better education through the 
school system and communication by scientists. What is still missing is an 
analysis of the wider culture itself beyond its response to the scientific 
establishment. In the broadest representations culture is used as an independent 
variable that influences understanding and acceptance of science (Allum et al., 
2008, Durant et al., 2000, Gregory and Miller, 2000,   Kirejczyk, 1999) rather 
than science itself being a cultural object. 
In a broad examination of the research of the past 25 years, Bauer, Allum, and
Miller (Bauer et al., 2007) lay out a future research agenda for PUS that does 
bring in a more complicated relationship between public understanding, 
knowledge, and culture. However, they still represent scientific culture as 
something that is hopefully transmitted from the scientist to the public. Scientific
culture, used in this way, involves acceptance of the scientific method, but more 
importantly, acceptance of the results of science. The goal of PUS and the NSF 
and Royal Society studies is to spread that type of culture more broadly. The plan 
is that scientific culture should no longer be a perspective held by scientists and 
their intellectual allies, but by society as a whole.
However, what they overlook is that science is not an encapsulated object that
belongs to itself. It is inherently part of the culture and is used and abused 
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differently by different segments of the population. Science does not belong to 
scientist or intellectuals or academics alone. At least in the U.S., it has become a 
central part of the culture. It is the central engine of the idea of progress in the 
past years and is, hence, a central part of the concept of modernity. In these ways 
it is not a part of the scientific establishment, but part of the cultural ideology in a
manner similar to religion, or the notion of the family, or the appropriate form of 
government. The way people understand, feel towards, and use the objects of 
science is as deeply involved in these other cultural objects as they are in the work
of the scientific establishment. In fact, it is likely more connected to the wider 
culture than to the methodological process or results of scientific endeavors. 
Essentially, we have two sciences: the science of the scientific establishment and 
science as an idea in the greater public. Turning our gaze toward the role of 
science as an idea will greatly enhance our understanding of the processes.
The Research
This study investigates the nature of the cultural understanding of science in 
two parts. The first part examines the image of scientists in film. The themes 
associated with the critique of modernity and of science as the pinnacle of 
rationalism are clearly represented. The scientist becomes the embodiment of all 
of our concern, discomfort, and fear about science. The stereotype of the odd, 
socially inept scientist is alive and well. The destructive power of science is a 
constant theme. Even so, scientists are not wholly disparaged. They are often the 
protagonist. However, they cannot triumph using science alone, but must engage 
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in other efforts to solve the central problem of the film, often to correct their own 
mistakes committed as a result of their own arrogance.
The second part examines data on attitudes toward and knowledge of science.
This analysis breaks these perspectives into pro-science and anti-science 
attitudes. These attitudes are influenced, as one might expect, by the level of 
scientific knowledge and education of the respondent. However, this is only a 
small part of what comes together to predict these attitudes. Other attitudes and 
ideological perspectives, including the idea of scientific destruction and other 
themes from the critique of modernity, are as, if not more, important. Ultimately,
this analysis clearly shows that the cultural construction of science is very 
different from the methodology of the scientist.
This research brings forth three contradictions. The first is the continuing 
fight over modernity. Science is a central and revered part of our society, but it is 
simultaneously seen as the source of the potential destruction of all that is good. 
Science alienates us from our families, it divides us from nature, and it creates 
destructive forces that can be loosed on the population. These themes can be seen
in both the film and the survey data. Interestingly, post-modern themes do not 
play as large a role in either the film or the survey data. The ideas of decentered 
knowledge and the end of grand narratives are not widespread. They crop up 
occasionally in films, such as when the main character in Medicine Man gives up 
his scientific instruments to search for knowledge (the cure for cancer no less) 
with a native tribe, but are rare otherwise.
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The second seeming contradiction is between the film representation of 
scientists and the public impression of them. The films in this study (and 
generally in other studies of scientists in film) present a very negative picture of 
scientists. They are nerdy, geeky, and often destructive when they aren't being 
ineffective. Their science is more often a hindrance than a help. This is, in part, 
an artifact of the medium. Science becomes a narrative tool and when the plot 
needs a problem to solve, it is easy to use a scientific disaster to create the 
problem. The same thing can be said for the recent spate of environmental 
destruction films. However, the question remains why the scientist is the stock 
character that is so often picked for this role. Clearly, the concerns about 
modernity are easily represented by science. Movies need characters and science 
becomes represented by a character in the form of a scientist. Hence, some of the 
negative representation can be seen to be a result of the easy use of common roles
as necessitated by the modern mainstream movie.
In contrast to this cinematic representation, large scale public surveys and the
NSF survey data used for this analysis show that scientists are seen quite 
positively.  The 1989 General Social Survey scientists rated a very high prestige 
score of 73 out of 100 (Davis, 1991). Questions from the survey regarding positive 
aspects of scientists get very high levels of agreement. When asked if scientists 
are working for the good of humanity, 86% of respondents agree. The also 
respond that scientists are helping to solve challenging problems (97%) and are 
making life better for people (88%).
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This positive impression seems at odds with the negative view we see in 
movies, though this should not be overdrawn. The movies do present scientists as
creating more problems than they solve. However, they also present them as 
protagonists who could potentially be heroes which implies at least the possibility
of positive work. Additionally, the outcome of their science is not always or 
entirely negative. It can be used along with other types of effort (e.g., physical 
force) to save the day. Even more important, however, is that the survey data 
shows a much more nuanced impression of scientists and science than do the 
movies. While there are broad positive attitudes, there are also complex negative 
attitudes towards scientists and science.
The third seeming contradiction is between positive and negative attitudes 
towards science. People are not always clearly pro or anti-science. It is possible to
be highly supportive (as most people are) and still harbor a significant level of 
suspicion about science. This may sometimes take the form of a cogent critique of
the science as practiced. However, it often represents a seemingly contradictory 
set of attitudes that assume that science will both improve our lives and destroy 
us. 
These three apparent contradictions are a central part of the social 
understanding of science and the role of the scientist. We cannot think 
meaningfully about science without including all of the cultural concerns about 
the nature of science. Additionally, the way in which science is applied by the 
public is not aligned with the way it is applied by scientists. The superficial and 
stereotypical trappings of the scientific method are enough to convince people 
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that something is scientific. As we will see, this is not simply a function of lack of 
understanding since understanding of and attitudes toward science are 
surprisingly associated with ideology more than knowledge. This helps explain 
why pseudoscience is broadly accepted. Hence, the methodology becomes a ritual
to be performed to prove something true, rather than a set of rules for practice. 
Ultimately, science in the public is a cultural artifact. It is understood and used in
ways that are not intended by scientists and that violate the fundamental 
principles of science. Yet, to the public it is science.
18
CHAPTER 2
IMAGES OF SCIENTISTS: EXAMINING FILMS
Everyone is familiar with the image of the mad scientist. The crazy man 
wearing a lab coat and concocting evil potions in a dark, dingy lab is such a 
cultural staple that many of the studies that examine the image of the scientist 
use this as their starting point for comparison. However, as is the case for many 
other simple stereotypes, the reality of the representation is much more complex. 
In addition, the meaning of the image that is constructed has much greater 
significance than the mad scientist figure would imply. We can elaborate both the
full range of the scientist image and the underlying societal ideas by carefully 
examining how this image is constructed.
What follows here is an exploratory study of the ways in which movies portray
scientists. This empirical analysis is a first step in uncovering the societal image 
or idea of scientists. When members of our culture think of a scientist we ascribe 
certain characteristics to the individual based on our expectations. Hence, our 
notion of the role of the scientist is in turn dependent on other ideas that are 
embedded in the social fabric of American society. Investigating the image of the 
scientist can not only elucidate the social conceptions of science but also help us 
recover, if not the origins, at least the elements perpetuating other underlying 
concepts, including some notion of our feelings towards knowledge itself. Our 
understanding of the place of science in the world comes, in part, from the 
images we see of scientists that come from many different locations: television, 
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the news media, school, and movies among others. This research explores the 
images of scientists in movies as a first attempt to explain our society’s 
ambivalent relationship to science.
Movies can be analyzed in many ways. One of the most common modes of 
analysis, related to the literary model, is a thematic study. In this type of study, 
most often seen in the context of film theory, the meaning of the film as a whole 
is investigated. Other studies have looked at the popularity of different types of 
movies; still others have focused on the very difficult task of attempting to 
discover the audience’s interpretation of various movies. This work will look at 
movies as producing ideas, and hence their creators as producers of ideas. These 
ideas can be separated from the greater theme of the movie and examined in 
parts. While it is clear that not all members of the film industry would be 
considered intellectuals in the traditional sense, they are nonetheless responsible 
for constructing ideas that are then distributed to a wide audience. This group is 
closer to Mannheim’s definition of intelligentsia as “social groups whose special 
task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society” (1936, p. 10). 
Thus, they are at least partly responsible for the public idea of science. 
Clearly, there are "production of culture" (Peterson and Anand, 2004) issues 
involved in film representations of scientists. Most of the movies in this study 
come from large studios. As Peterson notes, "[o]nce consumer tastes are reified 
as a market, those in the field tailor their actions to create cultural goods like 
those that are currently most popular." (p. 317). This is not to say that the images 
of scientists are merely a reflection of consumer beliefs, but that stereotypical 
20
images of scientists in film, once accepted by consumers, become a resource that 
filmmakers can and do use.
There are a number of studies that investigate the portrayal of scientists in 
film. Steven Goldman touches on these issues in his study of technology as 
represented in film (1989). He concluded that most movies show suspicion 
towards technology and present it to a large degree as anti-human. His study only
examines the scientist as the purveyor of technology; while this is a common 
representation of the scientist it does not include all of the ways in which 
scientists are represented. Additionally, since Goldman is attempting to elaborate
the ways in which we are suspicious of technology he chooses films with a 
negative perspective and thus may miss ways in which technology is positively 
portrayed. 
Comstock and Tully (1985) examined 4,541 films released in the United States
from 1939 to 1976, using American Film Institute plot summaries that contained 
scientific or technological innovation as a major theme. Approximately forty 
percent of the innovators were scientists. An additional thirteen percent were 
doctors, five percent were engineers and four percent were professors. All of 
these categories might be defined as scientists, so their data, while not exactly 
parallel to the current study can be used to illuminate the study of images of 
scientists. They found that the innovator tends to be a loner and is equally likely 
to be harmed as to be left unharmed by their own innovation. They found that 
forty percent of the films showed acts of innovation as harmful to others, thirty 
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percent showed positive consequences and the remaining were neither positive or
negative. 
There are differences in the frequency of representations of innovation based 
on historical periods. During World War II and its aftermath and during the 
1970s, Comstock and Tully found innovation was relatively scarce as a movie 
theme (7.14% and 2.86% of movies respectively). It was more common during the
Sputnik era and the 1960s (21.05% and 25.00% of movies respectively). 
Additionally, the type of film that portrayed innovation changed. Science fiction 
and horror films were the primary vehicle for innovation during the Sputnik era 
and the 1960s. Drama was more likely to present innovation during World War II
and the 1970s. Finally, the success rate for innovation was significantly 
influenced by the era. During the World War II period there were no failures. In 
contrast, during the sixties there was a high failure rate (40%) for innovation. The
other two periods had failure rates of approximately 15%. While the authors do 
not address these historical differences in any depth, they do attribute the 
differences to a combination of genre and historical era. Science fiction, 
according to the authors, “embodies conventions that encourage a negative 
portrayal of innovation.” (p. 105) They link this genre effect to historical eras of 
“national malaise.” (p. 105) Drama, they argue, allows for a more serious 
depiction of innovators and innovation. However, they do not address the 
question as to why this serious examination would not allow for a critical 
examination of the nature of innovation rather than the stereotypical picture that 
emerged.
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An interpretive study of science fiction movies (Landy, 1993) notes that there 
have been changes in the images of scientists before and after WWII. Prior to the 
war scientists were portrayed, for the most part, as lonely geniuses who toiled in 
their laboratories, misunderstood by society. The creations of these scientists are 
often disruptive to society (e.g. Frankenstein’s creature). After WWII the scientist
becomes attached to institutions such as the government or the military. 
However, this integration into society does not imply acceptance of the work of 
the scientists. In fact, the authors argue that there is an increase in the tension 
between the potential benefits and the negative consequences of science.
Spencer Weart (1988) has investigated the image of scientists across a range 
of media. His interpretive investigation covers movies, television, government 
reports, literature and newspapers. His work finds that the stereotype of the 
scientist is that of a dangerous individual who may also be mad. He notes that 
there are positive images of the scientist (particularly in the first half of the 20th 
century). Specifically, scientists were seen as "noble geniuses working for the 
good of humanity." (p. 30) The stereotype changes over time from that of 
sorcerer (19th century) to scientist as spy (WWII) to scientist as tyrant or 
monster (post-WWII). Underlying these images are ideas about the nature of the 
scientist: the scientist as an authority who knows too much, or the scientist as 
holder of too much power over which society has no control. 
One seemingly positive stereotype (popular during the 1930s and 1940s) 
portrays the scientist as self-sacrificing (e.g., Marie Curie ignoring the risks of 
radiation to continue her research). However, it was underlaid with the 
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assumption that, along with sacrificing their health or time, scientists also 
sacrificed a portion of their humanity. Scientists came to be shown as 
unemotional. Thus, while the work done by scientists was considered valuable in 
many cases and the scientists were portrayed as generally good people, they were 
still seen as somewhat odd. While biography can be seen as a different genre than
entirely fictional accounts, the film still depicts only a fraction of the story. In 
fact, the direction the story takes can be especially illuminating. When the person
who is portrayed is well studied, and hopefully well understood, the aspects of life
that are portrayed represent choices that may more clearly show the ideological 
base of the filmmaker. Ultimately, Weart argues that while there are many origins
for these images of scientists, they are perpetuated by the fact that people are 
"bewildered and threatened by the advance of technology." (p.36)
David Skal's (1998) book Screams of Reason: Mad Science and Modern 
Culture, analyzes only the image of the mad scientist in movies. He connects 
these negative images of scientists to what he believes is the dehumanizing nature
of scientific materialism. This is a primarily interpretive and non-systematic 
study that only examines the most extreme images of scientists and largely 
becomes an excuse for his own anti-science sentiments.
With the exception of the research conducted by Comstock and Tully, there 
have been no large-scale systematic studies of the representation of science or 
scientists in film. Additionally, none of the studies directly examined the image of
the scientist as the central concern. There is a difference between the image of the
scientist, the image of science, and the image of technology: while these three are 
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clearly interrelated they are not interchangeable. There is also a limitation 
inherent in examining only science fiction films, a method used in several of 
these studies. While the current study certainly looks at a disproportionately 
large number of science fiction films compared to their representation among all 
films produced, nonetheless they do not represent all genres that use scientists as
characters. Thus, examining only one genre (science fiction) will ignore potential 
differences in the representations of scientists.
There has been one systematic study of the image of scientists on television. 
Gerbner (1987) investigated scientists as portrayed in prime-time dramas from 
1973-1983. He found that scientists are on the whole positively portrayed, but 
they are less positively portrayed than other professions. Thus, as noted earlier 
one out of five scientists are portrayed negatively compared to one out of 
nineteen doctors and one out of forty law enforcers. They are also more likely to 
fail: one out of two scientists compared to one out of five doctors and one out of 
eight law enforcement personnel. Finally, they are the most likely to kill (5%) or 
be killed (10%). It is remarkable that scientists are more likely to kill than police. 
They are shown as stronger and smarter but also as the least sociable of the 
professions. Perhaps most importantly, while they are not portrayed as the 
stereotypical mad scientist, their image is somewhat foreboding and “touched 
with a sense of evil, trouble, and peril” (p. 112). Thus, while the overall image of 
scientists on television is positive, the scientist has more negative characteristics 
than other professionals.
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The current study examines movies during the period 1990-1994 and finds 
that the overall representation of the scientist is one of lack of efficacy. Scientists 
are portrayed as awkward, geeky, socially inept people whose obsession with 
science is misguided. They are very likely to cause some sort of problem that 
results from their scientific work. Unfortunately for the scientists in this sample, 
they are unable to use science alone to solve these problems. The result of this 
portrayal is a consistent theme: the impotence of science. The real solutions 
implied by these movies are provided by emotional connection, mystical forces, 
or (often violent) physical effort. While the stereotypical portrayal is somewhat 
modulated by the level of sophistication of the film, it exists across all movie 
types, from comedy to drama to science fiction.
Methodology
This research project used movies shown in the United States in the years 
1990-1994.  The duration of the period was chosen to allow for a deeper sampling
of movies during that time period, while keeping the sample size manageable. A 
five year period allows for the inclusion of both popular blockbusters and smaller 
budget, more intellectual films. This scientific sampling method allows for a more
balanced analysis than almost all of the previous research on scientists in film 
since only a fraction of the sociological studies randomly sample movies. 
Additionally, most other research examines only the representation of scientists 
without examining the actions of the scientist, and none examines the effect of 
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the scientific endeavors. Finally, most do not use a content analysis instrument, 
but instead use a holistic interpretive method.
The population of movies was created by examining lists of the top hundred 
grossing movies according to U.S. ticket sales for each year. Each list was 
scrutinized to determine whether the movie contained scientists, and whether the
movie was made substantially by a U.S. movie company or by a director based 
primarily in the United States. This process created an initial population list of 
forty four movies out of a list of five hundred movies (see Table 2.1).
To determine if a given movie contained any scientists I examined movie 
summaries and character lists. If the plot indicated the probable inclusion of a 
scientist among the characters the film was included in the population (see Table 
2.1). Movies that clearly did not contain scientists or were made in a language 
other than English, or that were not made by U.S. companies or directors were 
excluded. The remaining movies were reexamined, where possible, by 
investigating more detailed summaries of the plot and character lists.  This 
created the original population of forty-four movies that included scientists. 
From this group twenty movies were randomly chosen to create the final 
sample for the study. Some of the plot descriptions for movies in this sample 
implied or stated that there was a scientist in the movie when there was not one 
or the scientist did not fulfill the criteria for inclusion described below. 
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Table 2.1: Original Population of Movies
Ace Ventura: Pet Gremlins 2:  The New Batch Nell 
Detective* Highlander II:  The Quickening Richie Rich 
Andre Honey, I Blew Up the Kid The Rocketeer 
Awakenings I.Q. The Silence of the Lambs 
Back to the Future Part III Junior Sneakers 
Basic Instinct Jurassic Park Star Trek VI: The 
Batman Returns The Lawnmower Man Undiscovered Country
Beauty and the Beast Little Man Tate Star Trek:  Generations 
Candyman Man's Best Friend Stargate 
Darkman Medicine Man Street Fighter 
Dracula Memoirs of an Invisible Man Terminator 2:  Judgment Day 
Falling Down Milk Money Timecop 
Fire in the Sky Naked Gun 2 1/2: The Smell of Total Recall 
Flatliners Fear Toys 
Frankenstein      Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Tremors 
Freejack Final Insult 
The Fugitive
*Movies in bold were rejected from the sample.
Movies were considered to contain scientists based on two criteria. The first 
consists of screen time. If there were no scientists as main or supporting 
characters the movie was rejected. A main role is one where the character is 
central to the plot throughout the movie. A supporting role is one where the 
character is central to the plot of the movie in more than a few short instances. 
Secondary characters are ones that are seen only for a short while and not 
repeatedly. Even if the character is known to have been a scientist or had been 
previously portrayed as a scientist (e.g. Mr. Spock in Star Trek), if they were not 
designated or did not act as scientists in the movie viewed they were not 
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considered to be scientists. This choice ensures that the intent of the director is to
portray the character as a scientist. 
Movies that only include scientists in secondary roles were not included. This 
is due to the difficulty in determining from plot summaries all of the movies that 
contained scientists who were effectively walk-on characters. These characters 
are generally not included in cast lists or plot summaries and thus, a reliable 
population of movies containing scientists only as secondary characters cannot be
constructed using these methods. 
The second criterion was the definition of a scientist. For the purposes of this 
project a scientist is defined as a person who has a degree in or does research in 
the physical, biological, or social sciences or mathematics. Medical doctors will be
included as scientists only when their role is one of research rather than a purely 
clinical role, unless that role is central to the scientific endeavor in the movie. 
Psychologists who are performing the role of a therapist rather than a researcher 
will not be included. Finally, inventors and technologists (those people who 
create technology, e.g. a new form of matter transfer) will be included since our 
society does not make a clear distinction between science and technology. These 
two criteria produced a final sample of fifty scientists.
When the first examination of the original sample of twenty movies was 
completed, several films did not fulfill the above criteria. For example, the Plot 
summary for Andre describes one of the main characters as a marine biologist. 
However, while the real person the character is based on was a scientist this fact 
is not reflected in the film. Similarly, while Timecop supposedly includes the 
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scientist that invented the time machine, there are no scientists in the film that 
fulfill the criteria for main or supporting characters.
After watching all twenty movies and rejecting five I resampled the 
population list so as to replace the missing movies. This process continued until 
the sample of twenty movies that fulfilled all of the criteria was completed. 
Ultimately, twelve movies were viewed that were rejected from the final sample; 
thus thirty out of the forty-four movies were viewed. This means that out of five 
hundred movies the population of movies with scientists  over the period of 
1990-1994 is thirty-two and the sample used in this study represents 63% of the 
population (see Table 2.2 the final population list and Table 2.3 for the sample). 
The entire population was not coded due to the amount of time each movie 
requires to code and because this is one part of a larger work that will include a 
broader population.
Table 2.2: Final Population of Movies
Awakenings Honey, I Blew Up the Kid Naked Gun 2 1/2: 
Back to the Future III I.Q. The Smell of Fear
Beauty and the Beast Junior Nell
Bram Stoker's Dracula Jurassic Park Richie Rich
Candyman The Lawnmower Man The Silence of the Lambs 
Darkman Little Man Tate Sneakers
Fire in the Sky Man's Best Friend Star Trek: Generations
Flatliners Mary Shelley's Stargate 
The Fugitive Frankenstein Street Fighter 
Gremlins 2:  The New Medicine Man Terminator 2:  Judgment 
Batch Memoirs of an Invisible Day
Highlander II:  The Man Tremors
Quickening Milk Money
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Table 2.3: Sample of Movies
Beauty and the Beast Highlander II:  The Naked Gun 2 1/2: 
Bram Stoker's Dracula Quickening The Smell of Fear
Candyman Honey, I Blew Up the Kid Richie Rich
Darkman Little Man Tate The Silence of the Lambs 
Fire in the Sky Man's Best Friend Sneakers
Flatliners Mary Shelley's Stargate 
The Fugitive Frankenstein
Gremlins 2:  The New Medicine Man
Batch Milk Money
The sample is reasonably representative of the population. When examined 
by genre there is an underrepresentation of science fiction films (see Table 2.4). 
Movies in this genre represent twenty-two percent of the population but only ten 
percent of the sample. Horror films are slightly over represented as they 
constitute twenty-two percent of the population and thirty percent of the sample. 
However, as several of these movies could be represented in more than one genre
(many could be cross-listed as science fiction) this does not present any 
significant bias. Additionally, when examined by year released there is a 
reasonable distribution across all of the years (see Table 2.5). The year 1991 is 
slightly under sampled and the year 1994 is slightly over sampled. The movies did
not show significant differences by year so this slight weighting should not create 
any bias. 
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Table 2.4: Sample Representation of Population by Genre
Genre Proportion of
Sample (n)
Proportion of
Population (n)
Science Fiction 10% (2) 22% (7)
Action/Adventure 20% (4) 16% (5)
Horror 30% (6) 22% (7)
Drama 25% (5) 25% (8)
Comedy 15% (3) 16% (5)
Table 2.5: Sample Representation of Population by Year
Year Proportion of Sample (n) Proportion of Population (n)
1990 15% (3) 18% (6)
1991 25% (5) 18% (6)
1992 25% (5) 22% (7)
1993 15% (3) 15% (4)
1994 20% (4) 28% (9)
The movies were viewed using a content analysis instrument (see Appendix 
A). I divided the analysis into an examination of five general categories:  movie 
attributes, basic demographics for scientists, scientist’s role within the film, 
personality characteristics, and attitudes of other characters towards scientists. 
Since this is part of a larger research project, not all of the data collected by the 
content instrument will be used for this analysis. Specifically, the fourth and fifth 
categories (personality characteristics and attitudes of others) will not be 
included here. Most of the content categories are simply defined by the coding 
categories as listed in Appendix A. Those that are complex will be described here.
The first category, movie attributes, collected basic film level (as opposed to 
character level) information, themes and content. This includes aspects such as 
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intellectual level, basic plot, the time and place the movie is set, and the role and 
the use of science and technology. Intellectual level is simply designated as high, 
mid and low. Films that are directed at a high intellectual level are more complex 
in plot and characterization and less likely to have a simple plot conclusion. Films
at a middle intellectual level represent mainstream Hollywood movies. These 
films have more simple plots and characters but are not wholly formulaic or 
sensationalistic. Films at a low level are directed towards a juvenile audience and 
are formulaic with little character or plot development. 
The centrality of science to the plot is determined by the degree to which 
science is the central issue of the story. Thus, in Milk Money, science is mostly 
irrelevant because the story is primarily about romance. The scientist (known 
primarily as Dad) could have had any other profession where he needed to have a
just but possibly hopeless cause. The centrality of science is tangential when it 
helps move the plot along but is still not the central idea of the story, as in Richie 
Rich. In this movie science is used to help catch the bad guys but other means are
used as well. Science is central to the plot when science is the story as in Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein. In this movie the entire plot revolves around the use of 
science.
The second category, basic demographics for scientists, examines the general 
characteristics for each scientist. These include the nature of the scientific 
research, the type of scientist, their institutional affiliation, dress and types of 
research conducted. This section was completed for each scientist who appeared 
in the movie. 
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The third category, scientists’ role within the film, examined the way in which 
the scientists and the work of the scientists fits into the structure of the movie. 
This includes the centrality of the character, which measures how important the 
character is to the plot (e.g. main, supporting or secondary). The character’s 
centrality is determined by the importance of the character to the plot of the 
movie as well as their time on screen. Main characters are most often shown and 
are central to the plot. Supporting characters are important to the plot and are 
seen several times or for at least one extended scene. Secondary characters may 
appear only once and are generally seen for a short time. Members of crowd 
scenes who do not speak were not coded.
Summary
Most research on film representations of scientists to date have been 
unscientific in design and literary in analysis. While they provide us an insight 
into images of scientists, they suffer from significant selection bias. Films are 
often included because they include negative representations of scientists. While 
this is not a flaw if the purpose is to investigate negative representations of 
scientists, they do not tell us how scientists in film are generally portrayed.
This study does not presuppose a particular portrayal of scientists. The 
project was designed to give a relatively deep coverage of movies from one period 
to see the range of potential representations. The short time period avoids the 
common problem of investigating only box office hits which may miss more 
nuanced smaller films while allowing for an in depth examination of each film. 
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The inclusion of scientists as leading and supporting characters, rather than 
focusing on scientists as protagonists as most studies do, also provides a broader 
examination of film representations of science. As we will see in the next chapter, 
the broader examination, while there was some variation, did find a persistently 
negative image of scientists.
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CHAPTER 3
MAD SCIENTIST, INCOMPETENT SCIENTIST: IMAGES IN
FILMS
Despite the breadth and depth of examination of the films in this period, 
there is little variation in the representation of scientists. The movies examined 
here include images that parallel the stereotypical image of the scientist. Usually 
only parts of the image are used to construct the character, most often those of 
the destructive mad scientist and the nerdy, awkward scientist. While the use of 
these images tells us much about what scientists mean in the movies, there is 
more than these characteristics in their representations. Most interestingly, 
scientists are widely portrayed as the creators of problems that must be resolved 
using methods other than science. Ultimately, the scientist may even reject 
science.
Scientist Identification and Type
It is clearly evident from the movies in this sample that scientists need no 
introduction. Half of the scientists are not introduced directly as scientists; their 
role is generally assumed by location, dress or type of work. The white lab coat is 
so ubiquitous as a form of identification that cosmetic companies wanting to 
seem scientific put their sales people in lab coats. Placing a scientist in a room 
with equipment that is meant to look scientific (e.g. lab glassware, microscopes, 
black lab tables, various gauges and meters) is another way that scientists are 
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often identified as scientists. Those that are directly identified as scientists are 
usually signified through address, whether as doctor or professor. This combined 
with location allows the viewer to identify the character as a scientist. In 
Darkman, for example, the two scientists are first seen in a room with varied 
technology and glassware. The main character, Dr. Payton Westlake, is seen 
taking pictures of his assistant. When he starts scanning the pictures into a 
computer he becomes a scientist to the audience. 
Scientists are also rarely categorized directly into disciplines. One of the 
central organizing principles of the academic world is not of particular interest in 
these movies. Most of these scientists never introduce themselves or are 
introduced by others by discipline or make any real reference to their area of 
study. Only rarely is their research described as it would be by scientists in 
reality. Dividing scientists into types for the purposes of this research, hence, is 
based on the kind of equipment they are working with and extrapolation from 
verbal clues about their research. 
Occasionally, as in Highlander II: The Quickening, the scientist’s actual 
research is described in detail. In this particular case the protagonist’s work in 
creating a shield to protect society from the harmful rays of the sun is described 
in voiceover. This is done not to make sure that the audience knows what type of 
scientist he is, but rather to shorten a discussion of this portion of the story. The 
primary character’s role (Connor McLeod, the Highlander) is not really centered 
around his position as a scientist, so the voiceover provides an efficient way to 
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establish this aspect without interfering with the more crucial aspects of his place 
in the film (as a supernatural superhero).
The general lack of specific details regarding the scientists’ work is to be 
expected. The writers and directors include only that which is necessary to 
convey important information that moves the story along for the audience. The 
exact discipline, sub-discipline, or research project is not crucial information for 
the audience. However, this tendency accentuates the monolithic nature of 
science that is presented by these movies. The exact nature of the scientist is not 
the determining factor for the character. The most important information is 
merely the fact that the person is a scientist. Thus, the scientist becomes closer to 
a single type rather than a myriad of different types.
The resulting distribution of scientists into broad disciplines is indicative of 
the popular definition of a scientist as a physical or biological scientist, i.e., a 
chemist, biologist, or physicist. Few people outside of the academic world would 
consciously place social scientists into the scientist category, and this tendency is 
reflected in the movies in this sample. The largest number of  scientists 
represented are “hard” scientists with chemists, biologists, and physicists making
up 38% of all of the scientists. While this category does include one 
mathematician, he is represented as a researcher who creates military technology
(Sneakers) rather than a mathematician only, and thus is also closer to the 
stereotypical view of a scientist. Social scientists and medical doctors represent 
22% of the total each. The remaining scientists are technologists (10%) and 
unidentified scientists (8%).
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There is an even greater trend towards stereotypical scientific disciplines 
when looking at the centrality of the scientist’s role. Medical and hard scientists 
make up the majority of all main characters (38% each) as compared to social 
scientists (19%) and technologists (6%). All types of scientists are more evenly 
represented among the supporting characters, with a slight bias towards hard 
scientists. There is an even stronger tendency towards hard scientists in 
secondary roles (42%). All of the characters whose discipline is unknown are 
secondary characters. This is an unsurprising outgrowth of the lack of clear 
discipline designations for any of the scientists. Since secondary characters are 
only on screen for a few moments there is little opportunity to determine the type
of research they do. They are usually easily designated as scientists by location (in
a lab, for example), dress (wearing a lab coat) or address (being called Doctor).
Geeks and Nerds: Personal Characteristics of the Scientist
The breakdown of scientists by sex represents both reality and stereotypes. 
The majority of the scientists, not surprisingly, are male (72%). Female scientists 
are most likely to be social scientists: almost half of all female characters coded 
(45%) are social scientists. However, social scientist characters are evenly divided
between males and females. Both pure and medical scientists are approximately 
80% male, and technologists are entirely male.
There was little ethnic or racial diversity among the scientists. There was one 
black female supporting character and one Asian male secondary character. The 
only diversity in ethnicity was the large number of European scientists. However, 
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this is the result of movies that were set in Europe (e.g. “Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein”) and not because many movies set in the United States included 
European scientists. 
The physical representation of scientists is also stereotypical. A rumpled, 
physically unfit, awkward man with messy and often long hair fills the standard 
expectation and goes along with the lab coat as an easy identifier of position as 
scientist. This measure, appearance, is a compilation of dress, cleanliness and 
physique. While not all scientists were portrayed as unkempt, poorly dressed, 
overweight or awkward there was a clear tendency towards representing 
scientists in this manner. For example, the scientist in Beauty and the Beast 
(Belle’s father) is portrayed as a short, fat man who wears bizarre clothes and is 
generally unkempt and awkward. Dr. Alan Neyman, co-creator of the shield in 
Highlander is overweight and ill dressed. Professor Keanbean in Richie Rich is 
oddly dressed,  overweight and physically awkward. Approximately half (47%) of 
all the scientists in the sample had one or more of these negative physical 
characteristics. Technologists were most likely to be represented in this way, 
fulfilling the expectation of the crazy inventor. Three of the four characters in this
category were portrayed with one or more physical attributes that would be seen 
as negative. 
The ultimate representation is Dr. Wayne Szalinzki in Honey I Blew Up the 
Kid. He dresses poorly, is only minimally groomed (especially for the main 
character in a movie) and is usually wearing some strange invention on his head. 
It is important that Rick Moranis was chosen as the actor for this part. His 
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physical type fulfills the stereotype of the oddball scientist. He is, as he represents
himself in film, awkward and goofy. The role could not be the same if Tom Cruise 
were to play it. Hard scientists (69%) were also more likely to be portrayed in this
way as well. Finally, the two categories of medical doctors and social scientists, 
people who are less likely to be identified as scientists in the minds of the general 
public, were much less likely to be represented with negative physical 
characteristics (27% each). 
However, scientists' centrality in a film is also significant in the physical 
representation. Main characters were more likely to be represented without any 
negative physical traits (63%) than with them. They were also more likely to be 
physically neutral or attractive than were supporting characters. Over half (58%) 
of supporting role scientists were presented with negative physical 
characteristics. The secondary characters were very evenly split between positive/
neutral and negative physical types. It is more difficult to portray a protagonist as
an unappealing character than to have his or her sidekick be odd or unattractive. 
Nonetheless, the protagonists are often a bit eccentric. Dr. Jackson in Stargate is 
the central character. He is clearly attractive (played by James Spader) but wears 
a long, odd looking scarf and has slightly messy hair and the obligatory glasses. 
His physical appearance is a signifier of his role as scientist.
There is also an important “movie level” effect. Movies directed at a low 
intellectual level are more likely to present stereotypical presentations of 
scientists than are movies at directed at a general level or a highly intellectual 
level. Scientists in low level movies are more likely to have at least one negative 
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physical characteristic than in any other type. Sixty-two percent of scientists in 
these movies are portrayed with negative physical characteristics as opposed to 
only 33% of scientists in high level movies. Mid-level movies split the portrayal of
physical type almost evenly between negative and positive/neutral portrayals of 
physical type.
Scientists Messing Up: Problem Creation
The scientists in these movies are overwhelmingly responsible for creating 
some problem that must be resolved. These range from small problems that delay
the resolution of the larger problem, to creating the central problem of the movie.
Three quarters of the scientists are directly responsible for at least one problem 
(large or small). Sixty percent of the scientists are at least partially responsible for
the central problem of the movie. 
Medical doctors (72%), social scientists (72%) and pure scientists (63%) are 
all very likely to be at least partially responsible for causing the central problem. 
Only forty percent of the technologists share some blame for the main problem; 
however, all of them create at least one serious problem in the film. Ninety 
percent of medical doctors, eighty-one percent of social scientists and sixty-eight 
percent of pure scientists create at least one problem.
When problem creation is examined at the level of the movie we see that fifty 
percent of the movies have central problems that are created by a scientist (see 
Table 3.1). Twenty percent have central problems that are partially created by a 
scientist. In only thirty percent of the movies is a scientist not responsible in any 
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way for the central problem. When we look at the creation of any type of problem 
we are left with only two movies or ten percent of the sample where scientists 
don’t create any problems (Dracula and Milk Money).
Table 3.1: Scientist's Responsibility for Creating the Central Problem
Fully Responsible Partially Responsible Not Responsible 
Beauty and the Beast Gremlins 2: The New Batch Bram Stoker's Dracula 
Candyman Little Man Tate Darkman 
Fire in the Sky Medicine Man Milk Money 
Flatliners Sneakers Naked Gun 2 1/2:  
The Fugitive The Smell of Fear 
Highlander II: The Quickening Richie Rich 
Honey, I Blew Up the Kid The Silence of the Lambs 
Man's Best Friend
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein 
Stargate
The ways in which scientists create the main problem can be classified easily 
into three standard types:  creation of a monster, scientific arrogance, and 
business misuses of science (see Table 3.2). The creation of the monster follows 
the all-too familiar Frankenstein theme:  the scientist attempts to change nature 
and unleashes a monster on society. Scientific arrogance creates a problem by 
pursuing some scientific result without concern for the consequences to society 
or another individual. While the monster theme could fit under this heading I 
reserve it for those instances where there is no monster as such. Business is often 
portrayed as misusing science to further its own ends (usually monetary gain). 
This is not surprising, since as Lichter, Lichter, and Amundson (1997) report, 
over three decades television has represented business more negatively than 
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other occupations. However, what is interesting is the degree to which the results 
of the scientist can be manipulated by business. In this  category the worst 
tendencies of business and the scientist come together, and a monster created by 
a scientist is manipulated for business purposes.
Table 3.2: Type of Problem Creation                                        
Monster Scientific Arrogance Business
Beauty and the Beast Little Man Tate The Fugutive
Candyman Medicine Man Highlander II: The Quickening 
Fire in the Sky Sneakers Honey, I Blew Up the Kid
Flatliners Stargate Gremlins 2: The New Batch
Man's Best Friend
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein 
Creating Monsters
This is the largest of the three problem creation types. Of the fourteen films 
where the scientist has some responsibility for creating the central problem, six 
are due to monsters that are created or unleashed by scientists. These range from 
the traditional Frankenstein story (as in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein), to 
modern day horror stories such as Flatliners. In these films scientists insist, often
against the objections of others, on pushing their research agendas despite the 
clear danger they are unleashing on the public.
For example, Flatliners depicts a group of medical students who are eager to 
understand death. Each student in turn will be killed and then revived so they can
understand death. As a result of their experiment they bring back evil beings that 
recreate sins they have committed in their lives. The evil that they retrieve 
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through their work causes problems for them and others in the movie. In Man’s 
Best Friend, a scientist creates a super dog who is exceedingly smart and 
especially vicious and when let loose kills. The anthropologist in Candyman  is 
arrogant enough to disbelieve the local legend about calling a demon (the 
Candyman). She chants his name three times to show that her science is greater 
than their mythology; as a consequence she awakens a supernatural killer who 
haunts the Cabrini Green housing project in Chicago, where he proceeds to 
murder several innocent people (an interesting comment on the efficacy of social 
science research on poverty). The father in Beauty and the Beast gets lost on his 
way to a fair, disbelieves his horse’s clearly greater good sense and ends up locked
in the Beast’s castle, eventually causing his daughter to be locked up by the Beast.
Scientific Arrogance
Scientists create problems through their own obsession with their research in 
four movies (29%). In this category, scientists become so enamored with their 
own scientific exploration that they neglect to consider the ramifications of their 
research. The scientist is separated from society by an obsession with the pursuit 
of answers that may not be of the greatest value. As in the monster category, 
these scientists neglect the effect of their work on the wider society or the group 
to which they supposedly owe loyalty.
For example, in Stargate the arrogant assumption is that the main character 
(Dr. Jackson) is smart enough to solve any puzzle that creates the main problem. 
In the film he decodes an alien artifact that turns out to be a gate to other worlds. 
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He then assures the military that he can solve the code on the other side that will 
allow a team to investigate and return. It is clear to the viewer that he is lying: he 
assumes that he can figure it out and get them back. However, once they get there
he cannot find the solution immediately and they end up stranded on a planet 
that is attacked by a god-like alien. As a result his arrogance leads to the death of 
some members of the team.
Business Abuses Science
In four movies (29%) it is the effect of business on science that helps to create 
the problem. Business is clearly shown in these examples as a corrupting 
influence on science. In these movies the scientist or science is misused or even 
falsified to make money. This process always involves the corruption of one or 
more scientists who must take on the attitudes of the business establishment 
regarding the centrality of profit over the needs of society or even safety.
For example, in Gremlins 2 the main scientist attempts to use the gremlins to 
gain money for the company. He wants to research the evil gremlins’ abilities so 
that they can be harnessed for profit. In The Fugitive Dr. Kimball's wife is killed 
in an attempt to keep him from exposing fraudulent data regarding a drug study. 
Here, the entire problem is created by the chief scientist working on the research 
who wants to make money from a potentially dangerous and ineffective drug. In 
Highlander 2 science creates a solution to ozone depletion, the shield around the 
world, which a businessman maintains long after it is unnecessary because it 
46
makes him enormous profit, despite the fact that the invention has seriously 
negative effects on the population. 
The Environmental Exception
It is worth noting that the two movies that show the scientist in the most 
neutral or even positive light are movies with an environmental theme. In Milk 
Money and Naked Gun 2 1/2 the primary scientists are environmental scientists. 
Neither of these characters are main characters and the scientific theme is a 
secondary one. Even so, in Naked Gun 2 1/2 there is extremely stereotypical 
scientist. He works for the police department and is only referred to as Ted. He is 
almost the perfect portrayal of the inept, geeky scientist who spends valuable 
time discussing irrelevant information. His actions delay the investigation of the 
police into the attempted murder of the environmental scientist, Dr. Meinheimer.
Despite the generally positive light in which we see this latter character, he is still 
portrayed as a bore. While he has a proposal that will provide cheap, safe energy 
for the world he cannot make a speech that does not cause the entire audience to 
fall asleep. 
In Bram Stoker’s Dracula, Dr. Von Helsing helps find Dracula. His research 
is responsible for understanding what has happened to the woman who was 
bitten and why. Thus, science helps solve the problem, although the final solution
is dependent on physical action. Finally, in Darkman science allows for the 
resolution of the problem but it does so through violent means. The problem is 
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created by corrupt business and Dr. Westlake’s science allows him to 
impersonate people in ways that he knows will lead to their deaths. 
Ineffectual Scientists: Problem Solution
While scientists are likely to cause a problem, science is not likely to be the 
solution of the problem. Science may be a small part of the solution, but the 
ultimate resolution of the problem typically relies on other means. While thirty 
scientists (60%) participate in creating the central problem of the film to some 
degree or another, only eighteen scientists (36%) participate in the solution of the
main problem. These eighteen scientists come from thirteen of the twenty 
movies. Only three of these eighteen scientists did not participate in the creation 
of the central problem (Dr. Kimball in The Fugitive, Dr. Von Helsing in Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula, and the father in Milk Money). Thus, in approximately one 
third of the movies the scientist is not at all responsible for the solution of the 
problem even though he or she is likely to have caused it. 
There are three main categories for the ways in which scientists help solve the
central problem of the film:  science, physical effort, and emotional/spiritual 
changes. These categories can overlap, allowing a scientist to use two of these 
methods to solve the problem at hand. The Venn diagram (see Figure 3.1) 
represents the main method or methods scientists use to solve the central 
problem in the film.
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Science Physical
Spiritual/Emotional
The Silence of 
the Lambs
Richie Rich
Bram Stoker's Dracula
Darkman
Candyman
The Fugitive
Highlander II: 
The Quickening
Mary Shelley's 
FrankensteinHoney, I Blew Up the Kid
Flatliners
Medicine Man
Little Man Tate
Stargate
Figure 3.1: Central Problem Solution Types
Only three scientists (16%) participate in the solution of the central problem 
through the use of science alone. One of these characters is a supporting 
character (Dr. Keanbean in Richie Rich) and two are secondary characters (Dr. 
Pilcher and the graduate student in The Silence of the Lambs). In Dr. Keanbean’s 
case his inventions help catch the people who are trying to steal the Rich fortune. 
However, they also almost prevent that capture as well when they misfire, 
capture the heroes instead of the villains and generally fail to work as intended. 
In Silence of the Lambs scientific knowledge is a partial solution to the main 
49
problem. While the two scientists are not immediately involved in the final 
solution themselves, they are instrumental in its resolution. 
Science together with physical effort is another way that scientists participate 
in the solution of the central problem. Twenty-seven percent (five) of the 
scientists participate in the solution of the main problem through the use of a 
combination of science and physical effort by the scientists themselves. In this 
type of solution the science is generally secondary to the physical. Thus, science 
may help to solve the central problem (that it most likely created) but only as an 
adjunct to the physical prowess of the protagonist. In fact, in this category 
Darkman is the only movie that does not have a scientist protagonist who creates
the problem. However, in this movie, science is used in negative ways (getting 
people killed or maimed) to help prevent the corrupt businessman from 
completing his plan.
In Stargate, the scientist solves the archeological puzzle that allows the 
people to return to their planet, but he must also save his companions who have 
been taken hostage. He solves this part of the problem through the use of physical
force. He grabs a weapon and shoots the captors, allowing his companions to free
themselves. This, rather than his discovery of the solution to the archeological 
puzzle, is shown as his triumphant moment. 
In Honey, I Blew Up the Kid, Wayne Szalinski accidentally uses a ray gun on 
his toddler that makes him grow to building size. Several attempts to reduce the 
child fail and he goes on a giant toddler rampage. Only Dr. Szalizinski's  physical 
effort (jumping into his son’s giant pocket) that puts him in grave danger, 
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coupled with his emotional connection to his son, allow him to apply the 
scientific solution to reduce the child to normal size.
Three scientists (17%) resolve the main problem through physical effort alone.
In these films science is not a part of the solution in any significant way. All three 
of these movies are very distinct in theme and treatment. In both Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein and Candyman the protagonists are clearly defined by their role as 
a scientist. However, in Highlander II: the Quickening the scientific aspects of 
the protagonist must be introduced as a side story to an audience familiar with 
the character in his role primarily as a superhero. Thus, it is the first two films 
that may be more predictive in this category. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is the 
prototypical mad scientist film. While there are significantly deeper themes in the
movie, the one that stands out (based on the almost constant popular culture 
references) is that of the scientist’s project gone awry. This is also the theme of 
Candyman. In this case, as in the simplistic reading of any retelling of 
Frankenstein, the scientist creates a monster. The arrogance of the scientist is the
reason the beast is unleashed on an unsuspecting and undeserving populace. The 
character then sacrifices him or herself to gain redemption. In Candyman, the 
anthropologist who calls the Candyman, Helen Lyle, must throw herself into a 
bonfire to defeat the demon. Her anthropological research uncovers the myth of 
the Candyman, but is unable to defeat it.
In the remaining forty-eight percent (seven movies), problems are solved 
through the use of emotional or spiritual methods. In this type of solution a 
scientist must either come to terms with an emotional problem, or alternatively 
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turn the issue over to a spiritual power. For example, in Medicine Man the main 
character cannot find the chemical responsible for the cure for cancer he has 
discovered until he is shown the answer by the native medicine man, through the 
use of mind altering substances and a dream which the scientist must interpret. 
Only when he releases his grip on the scientific and accepts the mystical is he able
to solve the problem. Dr. Jane Grierson, in Little Man Tate, cannot truly reach 
Fred Tate until she learns to connect with him emotionally. She is charged with 
the development of Fred, who is a genius, when his mother allows him to join Dr. 
Grierson’s school for the gifted and talented. There is some irony here, in that Dr.
Grierson as a psychologist would have studied child development and would 
therefore have some knowledge of the emotional needs of her students. However,
such training would not fit with the overall picture of scientific geniuses who are 
emotionally disturbed as a result of their genius. The final scene of the movie 
shows Fred’s birthday, where a reluctant Dr. Grierson learns to relax and have 
fun by wearing a party hat and dancing.
Giving Up Science: Recovery of Identity
Eleven of the scientists portrayed in these movies undergo an important 
transformation as a result of their scientific research. This transformation 
consists of a recovery of personal identity that encompasses at least a partial 
rejection of their role as a scientist. This rejection is often presented as if the 
character had been under the influence of some outside force, causing them to act
inappropriately, ignore the needs of others or even place others in danger. Thus, 
52
to resolve the central problem of the film they must come out of their science-
induced fog and see the world the way it is. This is not entirely surprising when 
the character is the protagonist, as he or she must undergo some transformation 
in the course of the film. However, it is telling that in eight out of ten movies (all 
but Darkman and The Fugitive) one or more of the main characters who are 
scientists reject science to some degree as a result of their transformations.
One of the most extreme examples occurs in Stargate. In order to save his 
comrades (whom he has trapped on a dangerous planet) Dr. Jackson must use 
physical force. When he transforms into the hero (by rejecting his scientist role) 
he moves more confidently and looks more heroic and less mousy. He walks and 
acts more like the military personnel he has traveled with, than the scientists he 
started the investigation with. As a scientist he was always behaving in awkward 
and inappropriate ways, seeming to be enveloped in a cloud of his own thought. 
He walked into people, took newspapers out of the hands of someone without 
asking, and wrote on computer monitors with permanent markers. These were all
examples of how his scientific mind worked. He was focused on his science and 
not the needs of the people around him. This is a clear foreshadowing of how 
science, for him, overrides the needs of people. It effectively sets the audience up 
for the central problem he creates through his scientific arrogance. 
However, once he has transformed into the hero he is more closely welcomed 
into the company of the soldiers. He becomes “one of the guys” and no longer 
maintains any of the attributes associated with his scientific persona. In the end 
he fully rejects his scientific personality by remaining on a primitive world from 
53
which there is no return since the military plans to destroy the gate on the earth 
side. Clearly, he cannot be an archaeologist on a pre-literate planet. His 
permanent exile prohibits him from communicating with any other scientists 
even were he to continue with his work. The implication is that he plans to “just 
live” rather than continue his work. Therefore, he can finally find happiness with 
a woman he loves while leading a simple, prescientific life.
Another fairly obvious example occurs in Medicine Man. Dr. Campbell is 
attempting to find a cure for cancer in a South American rain forest. We learn 
that on a previous expedition he allowed his quest for an answer to overwhelm 
his good judgment, and as a result many people died. His current research 
project produces interesting and very promising results that he cannot verify 
scientifically. The point of transformation occurs when he uses his only working 
sample of the anti-cancer drug (which is irreplaceable) on one of the children 
from the native tribe. As a result of his sacrifice he receives the wisdom of the 
local medicine man who gives him the answer to his quest in a dream. He and the
female scientist who has been sent to monitor his work take on the ways of the 
local tribe and move deeper into the rain forest in the final scene, presumably to 
continue looking for the cure. The culmination of the movie makes it clear, that 
while he will still use some science, it is no longer his central tool. He becomes a 
nicer, more compassionate human being as he releases his grip on science and 
accepts the mystical.
Finally, a less extreme example of this phenomenon comes from Honey, I 
Blew Up the Kid. When Dr. Szalinski is able to shrink his child back to size he 
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reunites with his entire family and promises to be more involved in their lives, 
rather than obsessed with his inventions. He does not reject his science as fully as
in the previous two examples, but acknowledges its role as a potentially negative 
influence that could destroy his family.
Summary
The images of scientists in these movies will not simply be accepted at face 
value by a gullible public. Each viewer will adopt a slightly different perspective 
on the movies; however, all of those perspectives will include the central fact that 
scientists may be impotent with respect to solving the problems they construct. 
This transfers power from the scientist to the public who must regulate and 
manage the scientist. Furthermore, they will at least hear the message that 
scientific knowledge production is central to the construction of the ills of 
modern society. I am not attempting to evaluate the validity of these statements, 
but rather point out that they form a central and widely viewed portion of the 
discourse about society. The cultural dissonance that is managed through this 
countervailing discourse becomes not only an issue for the moviegoers, but also 
for our notion of science at a wider societal level. The images in these movies will 
influence how people think, and will affect at the very least the ways in which 
science must respond to the commentary from the outside. Ultimately, they 
provide a locus of negative images that pervade the discourse on science and 
hence affect its authority in society.
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CHAPTER 4
UNDISCRIMINATING SUPPORT: POSITIVE ATTITUDES
TOWARD SCIENCE
The National Science Board publishes a biannual report entitled Science and 
Engineering Indicators. The report is based, in part, on a broad public survey of 
attitudes towards science. The report examines attitudes towards science in a 
binary fashion; do people have positive or negative attitudes towards science? As 
the negative stereotypes seen in the film study imply, people's attitudes are much 
more complex than their potential position on a scale where one end represents 
positive attitudes, and the other negative attitudes. In fact, as this analysis shows 
people can hold both positive and negative attitudes simultaneously. We love 
science and hate it, we love scientists, and hate them. We rely on science to solve 
problems while condemning it for causing problems. This does not seem 
problematic when stated in this manner. Even when science is viewed as 
relatively monolithic, it may have successes in one area and failures in another. 
Hence, this type of attitude toward science is not unrealistic or contradictory. If it
were merely a nuanced impression it would seem a mature way to understand 
science. However, as the data show, people have complex, self-contradictory 
attitudes towards science. 
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Methodology
The central analysis here revolves around a factor analysis of the NSF survey  
data. This method was chosen for its ability to find underlying associations in the 
data that form an implicit construct. It is particularly valuable for datasets with 
broad ranging questions to excavate complex and often unintuitive connections 
between the answers.
The NSF phone survey includes data on a wide range of questions from 1,574 
adults. Questions range from attitudes toward science, to attentiveness to issues 
of the day (education, economics, foreign policy), to scientific knowledge 
questions, to media usage. This particular survey included questions regarding 
attitudes towards scientists that had not been included in previous years, and 
that are central to this analysis. The data for the 2002 report, collected in 2001, is
the source for this analysis. The survey oversamples educated people; however, a 
weight has been used to correct for this where appropriate.
The analysis used exploratory factor analysis in STATA to develop a broad 
ranging group of variables that are associated with attitudes towards science and 
scientists. The process included most of the questions in the survey to allow for 
the widest possible influences. Items that did not contribute to well-formed 
factors were dropped. Some questions were tested in a grouped format. For 
example, science media usage was combined to form a single variable. However, 
none of the combined variables were retained in the final analysis. Variables that 
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did not have factor loadings over 0.25 were dropped. A varimax rotation was used
to ensure the diversity of loadings on the factors. This produced well formed 
factors. Only one variable loaded across two factors. The degree of harm (as 
opposed to the degree of benefit) caused by science (I2B) loaded on both the pro 
and anti-science factors.
Factors one and three represent pro and anti-science attitudes and will be 
discussed in depth in this chapter and the next. They represent the degree to 
which respondents have positive attitudes towards science and the degree to 
which they have negative attitudes towards science. Since these are separate 
scales, positive attitudes are not merely the absence of negative attitudes. People 
may have highly positive attitudes towards science or very low positive attitudes 
towards science. Separate from that measure, they may have very negative 
attitudes towards science or not very negative attitudes towards science. In fact, 
they may have highly positive and highly negative attitudes simultaneously.
The resulting analysis produced three well-formed factors (see Table 4.1) that 
explain the variance in the data well. Cronbach's alpha, a measure of how well the
factor measures a unidimensional construct, for the pro-science factor is 0.75 
(factor 1) which meets the standard test of exceeding 0.70. The anti-science factor
(factor 3) is less internally consistent, but comes close with a value of 0.67. 
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Table 4.1: Factor Analysis
Method: iterated principal factors          Retained factors =        3
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst o!)     Number of params =       93
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
     Factor  |     Variance   Di!erence       Proportion    Cumulative
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
    Factor1  |      2.74451      0.58693         0.3966       0.3966
    Factor2  |      2.15757      0.13895         0.3118       0.7083
    Factor3  |      2.01863            .         0.2917       1.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(496) = 1.2e+04 Prob>chi2 = 
0.0000
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    -----------------------------------------------------------
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3 |   Uniqueness 
    -------------+------------------------------+--------------
              H1 |   0.2810    0.0858    0.0193 |      0.9133  
              H3 |  -0.1473   -0.1010    0.3328 |      0.8573  
              H4 |   0.2674    0.1487    0.0520 |      0.9037  
              H7 |   0.0148   -0.0574    0.3266 |      0.8898  
              H8 |  -0.0990   -0.0947    0.3454 |      0.8619  
              H9 |  -0.1775   -0.0114    0.3564 |      0.8413  
             H11 |   0.2718    0.0511    0.0076 |      0.9235  
             H12 |  -0.0752    0.0126    0.2854 |      0.9128  
             H15 |  -0.1891   -0.0269    0.2898 |      0.8795  
             H16 |   0.1109    0.0359    0.2610 |      0.9183  
              I1 |   0.5398    0.2472   -0.1021 |      0.6371  
             I2A |   0.5836    0.2285   -0.1875 |      0.5720  
             I2B |  -0.3432   -0.0844    0.3196 |      0.7729  
              I3 |   0.6196    0.0266    0.2065 |      0.5727  
             I4A |   0.7351   -0.0195    0.0668 |      0.4548  
             I4B |  -0.4909    0.1025    0.1848 |      0.7144  
              L1 |   0.0395   -0.0008    0.2765 |      0.9220  
              L2 |  -0.0925   -0.1264    0.3048 |      0.8826  
              L4 |   0.0717   -0.0268    0.4679 |      0.7752  
              L6 |   0.0451    0.0028    0.4523 |      0.7934  
              L8 |   0.0932    0.0323    0.3615 |      0.8596  
              L9 |   0.1264   -0.0151    0.4964 |      0.7373  
              M9 |   0.1001    0.3208   -0.0030 |      0.8870  
              P3 |   0.0188    0.0339    0.2692 |      0.9260  
              P4 |   0.1452    0.5446   -0.0177 |      0.6820  
              P5 |   0.1070    0.4978    0.1005 |      0.7306  
              P6 |   0.0443    0.6324   -0.0969 |      0.5888  
              P7 |   0.0252    0.7671   -0.0081 |      0.4109  
              P8 |  -0.0033    0.3926    0.1328 |      0.8282  
             P10 |   0.1593    0.3706   -0.0758 |      0.8315  
             P11 |   0.4275    0.0636    0.0191 |      0.8128  
             P13 |   0.4388    0.1355    0.0555 |      0.7860  
    -----------------------------------------------------------
    Cronbach's alpha 0.75      0.71      0.67
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A quarter of the respondents have high or moderately1 high factor scores on 
both scales (see Table 4.2). We like science, but we are also concerned about it. 
Were these to be completely opposite characteristics, respondents would only 
align with one clear factor where one side of the scale represents positive views 
and the other negative views.
Table 4.2: Distribution of Pro and Anti-Science Factor Scores
Anti-Science
Pro-Science Low Moderately
Low
Moderately
High
High Total
Low 3.0 3.5 5.2 4.5 16.2
Moderately Low 5.4 13.3 14.9 4.1 37.7
Moderately High 2.5 8.5 10.4 2.4 23.8
High 2.0 8.5 10.0 2.0 22.5
Total 12.9 33.8 40.5 13.0 100.2
 Factor two is central to the formation of factors one and three, but is not 
central to the larger analysis. This factor represents the orientation of the 
respondents to science in the news and includes the following questions: 
M9: The continents on which we live have been moving their location for 
millions of years and will continue to move in the future.
P4: Have you heard of magnetic therapy, or the use of magnets to cure pain 
and illness?
P5: Based on what you've read or heard, would you say that magnetic therapy
is very scientific, sort of scientific, or not at all scientific?
P6: Have you ever seen, heard or read about the theory of global warming - 
that average temperatures are rising slowly and will continue to rise 
mainly because of the burning of coal, oil, and other fuels?
P7: Do you believe the theory that increased carbon dioxide and other gases 
released into the atmosphere will, if unchecked, lead to global warming 
and an increase in average temperatures?
1. Low and high categories are scores one standard deviation below and above the mean.
Moderately low and high are scores less than one standard deviation below or above the
mean.
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P8: De you think that the possibility of global warming should be treated as a 
very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, or not a serious 
problem?
P10: How much have you hear or read about this issue (genetic engineering)?
These questions address issues that are widely covered in television shows 
about science. The first question regarding the continents is a staple of science 
shows. Magnetic therapy is a perennial topic on television shows that purport to 
investigate scientific claims for truth (although they often do not complete a real 
scientific analysis). Clearly, global warming has been a central news item for the 
past two decades. As we will see, genetic engineering is a topic that acts as a 
marker for controversy and the problems of science. This factor acts as an 
intermediary between the more complex pro and anti-science factors. It measures
the degree to which individuals have an awareness of what is widely represented 
in the media. Ultimately, it represents the non-ideological aspect of science 
awareness.
The Pro-Science Factor
The fact that many people see science positively is not surprising, even given 
the negative media stereotypes. The idea of science is deeply embedded in the 
nature of modern society. Since the Sputnik Era, American status in science 
education has been a significant national concern. The NSF  (2007) has recently 
created a national action plan for improving science and math education using 
the international PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) results 
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that show that U.S. fifteen year old science literacy in 2006 ranks 19th out of 57 
mostly industrialized countries as evidence for the need for improvement. While 
news coverage of this test and the TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study) results are not overwhelming, both are covered in national 
and major urban papers (e.g.,Dillon, 2007, Glod, 2007, Langland, 2008, Teicher, 
2007, Toppo, 2007) which generally express concern about our position in 
international rankings. Occasionally there is a defense of U.S. schools based on 
the inapplicability of the rankings, or problems with the construction of the 
rankings (e.g.,Farhi, 2007, Gardner, 2007). All of the articles bring in the issue of 
the United States' economic competitiveness. Hence, it is not science knowledge 
that is necessarily the central concern, but rather science as an economic engine.
We know that our ability to understand, use, and apply science is central to 
continued economic competitiveness, but there is also a moral component to our 
reach for science education. Scientists are people to be lauded, to be admired, 
even as we see from their depictions in film that they can be targets to be knocked
down. We think that knowing science is good for its own sake, not necessarily as a
deep cognitive benefit, but at least as a status symbol.
The positive image of science is not in direct contradiction to the less positive 
view of scientists seen in the films. There is a clear difference between the acts of 
the scientist and the general notion of science. The scientist is the representation 
of the negative aspects of science as practiced, rather than the representation of 
the concept as a whole. It examines those places where science, generally seen as 
positive, is perceived to fall down on the job. It also addresses science not as a 
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subject, but as a cultural concept. The scientist is the embodiment of the 
complexities of the public concept of science with all of the contradictions that 
implies. 
Describing the Pro-Science Factor
The questions that load on this factor can be broken into three basic 
categories: science in the abstract, science in practice, and science in application. 
Both science in the abstract and science in practice are conceptual categories 
without specific references. Science in application deals with the specific subject 
of genetic engineering. It is interesting to note that the practical ways include the 
common conflation of science and technology. When science is seen as practical it
is often confused with technology. As we will see there is a great deal of 
consensus that science is good both in both abstract and practical ways. It is only 
when we get to a specific application, the controversial topic of genetic 
engineering, that we start to see some differentiation in levels of support for 
science.
Science in the Abstract
There are four questions that deal with science in the abstract. The first deals 
with the problematic differentiation between science and technology. It (H4) asks
if scientific research that does not bring immediate benefits, but advances 
knowledge is necessary and should be supported by the federal government. The 
next three questions are linked. The first (I1) asks whether the benefits or 
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harmful results of science are greater. The second question in the group (I2A) 
restricts itself to people who say the benefits are greater and asks if the balance is 
strongly or slightly in favor of the benefits. The third (I2B) repeats the process for
those who said the harmful results were greater. This takes us straight back into 
the question that divides science and technology. While clearly many scientific 
discoveries lead to potentially beneficial or harmful technologies, scientific 
knowledge does not control the manner in which they are implemented. In other 
words, the same scientific knowledge can be used to create a technology that is 
considered morally good or bad.
Science in Practice
The next two questions ask about the ways in which science and technology 
impact the daily lives of everyday people. In these questions both science and 
technology are included directly. The first (H1) asks if "science and technology 
are making our lives healthier, easier, and more comfortable." The second (H11) 
asks if they have created "more opportunities for the next generation."  In fact, as 
Robert Wuthnow (1988) argues, technology has become, for many, a secular 
religion. He notes that we often confuse science and technology in nomenclature 
so that the word science becomes a substitute for technological advancement. 
Conversely, Florman (1981) notes the ways in which we have begun to blame 
technology for our social ills. We feel that technology is out of control: it has 
begun to control us rather than being under our control. 
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The complexity of attitudes toward technology aligns with the complexity of 
our attitudes toward science. We love it when it makes our lives easier and make 
it a scapegoat for the persistent problems inherent in any society. Since we don't 
separate technology from science, the presumed negative outgrowths of each 
become intertwined and ultimately confused.
Science in Application
The last set of questions asks about the clearly controversial topic of genetic 
engineering. The first set of questions asks about the benefits or harms due to 
genetic engineering research. First, as in the science question people are divided 
between those who say that the benefits are greater and those who say the harms 
are greater (I3). Then each group is asked if the benefits (I4A) or harm (I4B) are 
strongly or slightly greater. A more specific question (P11) asks whether 
respondents support or oppose the use of biotechnol0gy in foods. The final 
question in this group (P13) asks whether respondents support or oppose cloning 
animals "whose milk can be used to make drugs and vaccines."
Genetic engineering has been widely covered in the news as a controversial 
subject. A recent poll by the Pew Research Center (2007) shows that half of the 
population (51%) when asked "All in all which is more important, conducting 
stem cell research that might result in new cures OR not destroying the potential 
life of human embryos involved in this research” said research was more 
important. Roughly one third (35%) said not destroying the potential life. The 
rest (14%) were unsure. Earlier research (Priest, 2000) found a comparable 
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proportion (52.8%) with a positive view of genetic engineering in general. 
Significantly fewer people (Group, 2006) are in favor of genetically modified 
foods. Roughly one quarter of the population in 2006 (27%) were in favor and 
just under half (46%) opposed the introduction of genetically modified food into 
the food supply. A slightly smaller proportion (22%) are comfortable with animal 
cloning while almost two-thirds (64%) oppose it. Another survey (Urban and 
Huff, 2006) finds that roughly eighty percent of the population is opposed to 
human cloning.When the issue is framed in terms of medical research (Urban 
and Huff, 2006,  Nisbet, 2004) roughly half of the population is supportive.
Overall Science Receives Overwhelming Support
Overall, the impression of science is very positive. Examining the questions  
(using weighted data) from the pro-science factor (see Figure 4.1) is telling.  
Respondents are overwhelmingly positive in both abstract and practical 
categories. It is only when looking at the genetic engineering questions that the 
negative opinions become stronger, peaking with the most controversial issue - 
cloning.
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Figure 4.1: Selected Pro-Science Question Responses
We start to see the differentiation between types of science scores by looking 
at those people with high (one standard deviation above the mean) and low (one 
standard deviation below the mean) factor scores (see Table 4.3). Separating out 
these two groups allows a clearer look at those with strong, consistent attitudes. 
It shows the limits on both ends of the spectrum. Even those with low factor 
scores see value in both the abstract and practical aspects of science. However, 
they are much more likely to see harm in science than those with high scores. 
Again, we see that genetic engineering is a strong dividing line. No one with a low
factor score responded that the benefits of genetic engineering outweighed the 
harmful results. However, some were able to see benefits in genetically modified 
food and cloning animals for the production of medicine. Even so, these 
responses are well below that of the general results for this survey and other 
surveys on the same issue. Clearly, the less positive impression of science has 
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more to do with this controversial topic and a general assessment of the nature of
science than any sense of real and immediate impact on their own lives.
Table 4.3: Agreement with Questions for Low and High Values of Anti-Science 
Factor Score
Categories Questions Low 
Scores
High 
Scores
(1 ! 
Below 
Mean)
(1 ! 
Above 
Mean)
Difference
Abstract Science for Knowledge Only is 
Okay (H4)
60.8 94.1 33.3
Benefits of Science Outweigh 
Harm (I1)
9.0 100.0 91.0
Practical Science and Tech Make Lives 
Better (H1)
68.2 97.5 29.2
Science and Tech Create More 
Opportunities (H11)
69.4 96.1 26.6
Application Genetic Engineering Has 
Benefits (I3)
0.0 100.0 100.0
Biotech in Food  Acceptable 
(P11)
30.2 89.0 58.8
Cloning Animals Acceptable to
Make Drugs (P13)
18.0 86.7 68.7
Influencing the Factor: Attitudes, Beliefs, and a Bit of Knowledge
A multivariate regression was performed to examine what variables are 
associated with changes in the pro-science factor score. In what follows it is 
important to note that the current data set can only suggest, but not prove, causal
connections. 
The scored factor is bimodal (see Figure 4.2), representing two groups: one 
that scores lower on the pro-science scale (distribution A) and one that scores as 
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very pro-science (distribution B). This score does not measure any anti-science 
attitudes (which are measured by the anti-science factor), but rather how 
positively they feel about science.The distribution was divided up into two 
roughly normal distributions (see Appendix E) which were analyzed separately.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Pro-Science Factor Scores
Lower Factor Scores: Distribution A
So what predicts lower range pro-science scores? We can divide the answers 
into four basic categories: knowledge, attitudes, belief in pseudoscience, and 
stereotypes of scientists. It is interesting to note that no demographic variables 
were significant. Age, sex, and race did not show any statistically significant 
effects on the factor score despite the fact that other research shows women 
generally have less positive attitudes towards science than men (National Science 
Board, 2008, 2002).
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Table 4.4: Pro-Science Regression: Distribution A
Linear regression                               Number of obs =    1005
                                                F( 18,   986) =   23.60
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                R-squared     =  0.3114
                                                Root MSE      =  .48803
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
        |               Robust
  mfs1a |      Coef.  Std. Err.     t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
--------+---------------------------------------------------------
 SMEDUC |   .0142096   .0037366     3.80   0.000   .0068771    .0215422
   G2Ar |  -.0511995   .0256911    -1.99   0.047  -.1016149   -.000784
 CorSum |   .0148023   .0060878     2.43   0.015   .0028557    .0267489
     P7 |  -.0654346   .0175271    -3.73   0.000  -.0998293   -.0310399
    H10 |   .0531803   .0153554     3.46   0.001   .0230474    .0833133
   MICE |   .0828638    .017306     4.79   0.000   .0489029    .1168247
     H3 |  -.0574769   .0157774    -3.64   0.000  -.088438    -.0265157
     H9 |  -.1078643   .0175437    -6.15   0.000  -.1422915   -.073437
    H15 |  -.0962657   .0156814    -6.14   0.000  -.1270385   -.065493
     A6 |   .0693147   .0261325     2.65   0.008   .0180329    .1205965
     J4 |   .039771    .0133636     2.98   0.003   .0135465    .0659954
     K2 |   .1140665   .0366737     3.11   0.002   .0420991    .1860339
    P12 |   .0874905   .0163069     5.37   0.000   .0554901    .1194908
    H16 |   .0302981   .0128446     2.36   0.019   .0050922     .055504
     L1 |   .0531461   .0204782     2.60   0.010   .0129602    .0933319
     L2 |  -.0558335    .018536    -3.01   0.003  -.092208   -.0194589
     L3 |   .0529282   .0183092     2.89   0.004   .0169986    .0888577
     L9 |   .068649    .0156226     4.39   0.000   .0379916    .0993064
  _cons |  -2.136424   .2715162    -7.87   0.000   -2.66924   -1.603608
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Knowledge:
The knowledge variables present an interesting picture of the respondents. 
The number of science and math classes taken (SMEDUC) has a small, but 
significant positive effect on the pro-science score. However, self-assessment of 
their understanding of DNA (G2Ar) has a stronger negative effect. Hence, people 
who think they have a clear understanding of DNA are more likely to have a lower
pro-science score than someone who thinks they have little understanding. 
Variable G2B measures the assessment of trained raters regarding the 
respondent's answer to the question "Please tell me, in your own words, what is 
DNA?". However, since this question was not asked of people who said they had 
70
little understanding of DNA, it cannot be used in this model because too many 
cases have to be dropped (see Appendix B). There is little difference in the effect 
of other variables on the dependent variable, using either their self-assessed 
understanding or the trained rater's assessments. However, the trained rater's 
assessment is positively associated with the factor score. This change in direction 
is likely due to the fact that only half (52%) of those who self-assess their 
understanding at the highest level (clear understanding) are also assessed as fully
correct by the trained raters. Additionally, 34% of those who rated themselves as 
having a general sense of the nature of DNA were given the highest rating by the 
trained raters. Clearly, people are not always good at rating their own 
understanding since many who don't understand think they do and many who do
understand think they don't. Ultimately, the self-assessment shows that an overly
high opinion of one's own understanding is related to a less positive view of 
science. 
Having a higher score on a twenty question (see Appendix C) science fact test 
(CorSum) has a positive effect. However, knowing that increases in carbon 
dioxide causes global warming (P7) is associated with lower pro-science scores. 
Overall, it appears that having greater science knowledge does generally increase 
one's score; however, the magnitude of the increase is not large. This lack of 
strong correlation is well known (Allum et al., 2008, Evans, 1995, Miller, 1997, 
Pardo and Calvo, 2002). Additionally, for highly publicized topics like global 
warming there may be a negative effect. 
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The next two categories (attitudes and pseudoscience) are ideological 
variables. They examine the ways in which people think about science as an idea 
rather than as a methodology. 
Attitudes:
The attitude variables can be broken down into three sub-categories: 
positively, negatively and neutrally stated. The first positive variable (H10) asks if
respondents agree with the statement that "Work is more interesting with the 
application of science and new technology." The second question (MICE) asks if 
the benefits from research outweigh the pain caused to mice. Both of these are 
positively associated with the pro-science score. 
The three negatively stated questions are all negatively associated with the 
pro science scores. These ask if we depend too much on science and not enough 
on faith (H3), whether technological discoveries will destroy the earth (H9) and if
people would do better living a simpler life with less technology (H15).
There are four neutrally phrased questions. All four of these questions are 
coded so that higher scores represent positive attitudes toward science and they 
are all positively associated with the pro-science factor. For example, respondents
were asked if they are not interested or interested in news about issues related to 
the use of new inventions or technologies (A6). Those who said they were more 
interested had higher pro-science scores than those who were not. This group 
also included questions about the level of government spending on science (J4), 
whether the respondent would be happy if his or her son wanted to be a scientist 
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(K2), and whether the respondent supports  using biotechnology to detect 
inherited diseases (P12). The question about sons was also asked for daughters 
and the answers were surprisingly virtually identical. Only fourteen (0.1%)  
people who would be happy if their sons wanted to become scientists did not 
answer in like fashion about their daughters. Seven people who were neutral 
about their sons would be happy for their daughters. There is little difference (see
Appendix D) in the model when one is substituted for the other. However, they 
are clearly too highly correlated for both variables to be significantly associated 
with the dependent variable. This violates the linear regression assumption that 
the independent variables are independent of each other.
These attitudinal questions do not represent any significant surprises. 
Answers that represent positive attitudes towards science lead to higher pro-
science factor scores and those that represent negative attitudes lead to lower 
scores. What is of note is the magnitude of the coefficients. Only the question 
about government spending (J4) is below 0.5. Several are 0.8 or above (MICE, 
H9, H15, K2, P12). In comparison, the knowledge questions range have a much 
smaller impact on the variable (coefficients are 0.01, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.7) 
Interestingly, the question about "faith" and religion (H3) does not have as large 
an influence as those questions about the harm from technology (H9 & H15). 
Clearly, the post-apocalyptic scenario is very present in at least a significant 
segment of the public mind. Additionally, all of the attitudinal variables have 
larger effects than either education (SMEDUC) or knowledge (CorSum).
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Pseudoscience:
The second ideological variable is the pseudoscience variable (H16). The only 
question in this group asks if people strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly 
disagree with the statement that "Some of the unidentified flying objects that 
have been reported are really space vehicles from other civilizations." 
Surprisingly, this is positively associated with higher pro-science scores. While 
only slightly over one quarter of the population (28.9%) agrees with this 
statement, it does show that there are unscientific attitudes behind people with 
pro-science attitudes. We will also see this issue when examining the B 
distribution which represents higher pro-science scores. Again, these ideological 
variables are larger in effect than the knowledge variables. Hence, these pro-
science scores do not represent merely a greater knowledge of the scientific 
method, but are also importantly about people's perceptions of the overall value 
of science (mostly measured via technology) to society at large.
Stereotypes of Scientists:
There are four statements in this last category covering stereotypes. Lower 
scores represent disagreeing with the statement and higher scores with 
agreement.  Three of the statements are positively associated with the pro-science
score: scientists work alone (L1), scientists work for the good of humanity (L3), 
and scientists have few other interests beside their work (L9). One statement, 
scientific work is dangerous (L3,) is negatively associated with the factor score. 
People who score high tend to think that scientific work is much like the lone 
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scientist in the lab who has no outside life and is trying to solve the ills of the 
world. This "Marie Curie" stereotype is divided between the noble, positive 
aspects associated with increased pro-science scores, and the sad, tragic aspects 
associated with decreased scores. While what this represents is not entirely clear, 
it does show that pro-science attitudes (at the lower end of the distribution) are 
somehow intertwined with the idea of the sacrificing (but not too sacrificing) 
scientist.
Higher Factor Scores: Distribution B
So what predicts higher pro-science scores (see Table 4.5)? We can divide the 
answers into the same five basic categories used for the lower pro-science factor 
scores (distribution A): knowledge, attitudes, belief in pseudoscience, and 
stereotypes of scientists. Again, demographic variables have no statistically 
significant influence.
Knowledge:
The knowledge questions present more complexity than they did for the first 
distribution. The only measure of education that is significantly associated with 
the pro-science factor is the number of high school science courses taken 
(HSSCI). Interestingly, taking a higher number of high school science courses are
associated with lower scores in this part of the pro-science factor. All other 
measures of science and math knowledge were also negatively associated even 
though the association was not significant. 
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Table 4.5: Pro-Science Regression: Distribution B
  Source |       SS       df       MS           Number of obs =     566
---------+------------------------------        F( 17,   548) =   17.56
   Model |  14.9124057    17  .877200334        Prob > F      =  0.0000
Residual |  27.3739806   548  .049952519        R-squared     =  0.3527
---------+------------------------------        Adj R-squared =  0.3326
   Total |  42.2863863   565  .074843162        Root MSE      =   .2235
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
 mfs1b |      Coef.  Std. Err.     t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------+----------------------------------------------------------
 HSSCI |  -.0318896   .0103287    -3.09   0.002   -.0521783   -.0116008
  G3Ar |   .0512837   .0144958     3.54   0.000    .0228096    .0797579
   P10 |   .0479836   .0120797     3.97   0.000    .0242555    .0717118
    P7 |  -.0771923   .0109435    -7.05   0.000   -.0986887   -.0556958
    N2 |   .0503432   .0164493     3.06   0.002    .0180318    .0826545
  APEC |   .0474407   .0126387     3.75   0.000    .0226144     .072267
   H10 |   .0427463   .0107927     3.96   0.000    .0215462    .0639464
   H14 |   .0369634   .0110219     3.35   0.001    .0153131    .0586138
  MICE |   .0380156   .0111859     3.40   0.001    .0160431    .0599882
    H9 |  -.0456543   .0133179    -3.43   0.001   -.0718147   -.0194938
   H12 |  -.0491612   .0144007    -3.41   0.001   -.0774485    -.020874
   H15 |  -.06362     .0126357    -5.03   0.000   -.0884402   -.0387998
    J1 |   .0370106   .0125461     2.95   0.003    .0123663    .0616549
   P12 |   .0645608   .0131884     4.90   0.000    .0386548    .0904668
    H7 |   .0285782   .0115722     2.47   0.014    .0058469    .0513094
   H16 |   .0215345   .0081711     2.64   0.009     .005484    .0375851
    L4 |   .0353234   .0110287     3.20   0.001    .0136597     .056987
 _cons |  -.1809458   .1757194    -1.03   0.304   -.5261118    .1642202
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In this distribution, the self-assessment of understanding of the term 
molecule is positively associated with the factor score. As before respondents are 
not very good at estimating their own knowledge. Only thirty-eight percent who 
stated that they had a clear understanding of the concept were coded by trained 
raters as being fully correct. Self-assessed knowledge about biotechnology (P10) 
is also positively associated with the pro-science score. But also as before, 
agreeing that carbon dioxide emissions lead to global warming was negatively 
associated with higher factor scores. The general knowledge questions compiled 
as a set (CorSum) were not significantly associated with factor scores in this 
distribution and only one of the questions was significant. People who know that 
the earth goes around the sun (N2) had higher factor scores. The final knowledge 
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question is how attentive respondents were to economic and business conditions 
(APEC) which was positively associated with their pro-science score.
Clearly, accurate knowledge is not a necessary condition for high pro-science 
scores. The assumption on the part of the respondent that they are 
knowledgeable is important, but actual deep knowledge may not be. Hence, 
higher scores (particularly in the higher distribution) may not represent a 
measured evaluation of science, but rather represent a positive ideological 
approach to science. So, understanding global warming is not central, but paying 
close attention to other issues such as business, and feeling knowledgeable about 
science are crucial to high levels of support as measured by this factor.
Attitudes:
The first of the two ideological categories, attitudes, presents relationships 
between the variables and the dependent variable in the expected directions. The 
positive variables include science makes work more interesting (H10), new 
inventions will counteract the harmful consequences of other technologies (H14),
and if the benefits of research outweigh the pain to mice (MICE). All of these are 
positively associated with higher scores. The negative variables include the idea 
that technology will destroy the earth (H9), that technology creates an artificial 
and inhuman way of living (H12) and that we would be better off living a simpler 
life with less technology (H15). All of these are negatively associated with the pro-
science factor score. Finally, there are two neutral questions. Both support for 
government spending on space exploration(J1) and support for using 
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biotechnology to find inherited diseases (P12) are positively associated with the 
dependent variable.
In contrast to the lower end of factor scores (distribution A), the attitudinal 
questions do not show a greater degree of influence on the factor score than do 
the knowledge questions. However, they still show that concern about the 
negative effects of science and technology decreases positive perceptions of 
science.
Pseudoscience:
There are also two pseud0-science questions that are positively associated 
with the factor score. The first is believing that some numbers are luckier than 
others (H7). The second is the same UFO question (H16) that was significant for 
distribution A (some UFOS are from other planets). Clearly, these attitudes are 
contrary to scientific fact, but they are still associated with higher pro-science 
scores. This is not entirely remarkable given that only 24% of the population 
reject all three pseudoscience questions on the survey (the third addresses the 
scientific nature of astrology). Ultimately, while the ideological variables don't 
overwhelm the knowledge variables to the same degree that they do in 
distribution A, they are relatively larger than the non-ideological variables in total
effect. Again, we see that the pro-science attitude has a strong ideological 
component. While this result may seem contradictory, it is a large part of the 
divide between social and scientific conceptions of the nature of science. The 
social conception of science is not as innately tied to evidence and skepticism. It 
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also allows for the rejection of scientific knowledge as long as there is alternate 
evidence that can be explained in a seemingly scientific manner.
Stereotypes of Scientists:
There is only one question that involves a stereotype of scientists. People who 
agree that scientists don't get as much fun out of life (L4) are more likely to score 
higher on the pro-science factor than others. This is consonant with the idea that 
scientists are lone workers that strive for knowledge. It is part of the Marie Curie 
stereotype. While scientists may be single minded, this is a characteristic that is 
often portrayed in literature and hte media as a necessary part of the genius 
psyche.
Summary
The pro-science factor measures the degree to which people have positive 
views about science. To a great extent, people do have positive views of science. 
When asked questions about science in general and as mixed with technology, 
respondents are likely to have relatively positive opinions. Bring in the 
controversial subject of genetic engineering, which can stand in for other 
controversial science topics of different eras, and opinions are more likely to 
diverge.
What makes this factor even more interesting is the degree to which it is less 
sensitive to measures of education and knowledge than one might otherwise 
expect. Beliefs about the nature of science, stereotypes of scientists, and belief in 
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pseudoscience have a cumulatively much larger effect on overall attitudes 
towards science. Additionally, the relationship between knowledge and attitudes 
is not straightforward or even linear. Less knowledge can create more support in 
some cases. What this analysis points to is that there are strong ideological 
components to positive science attitudes. Support for science is wrapped up in 
ideas about modernity, including the post-modern rejection of absolute truths. It 
may even be the case that the most positive opinions of science do not come from 
those who are most knowledgeable about the subject, since this knowledge is 
likely to bring a more nuanced appreciation of the value and limits of science. The
most highly positive and exceedingly optimistic representation may  be limited to
those who don't fully appreciate science as a methodology as practiced in the real 
world.
The impact of the cultural representation of science is clear here. The 
variables that impact positive attitudes toward science are not limited to those 
that are directly related to the science of the scientist. The effect of the 
pseudoscience variables provides one clear clue. The negative perceptions of the 
potential outgrowth of science and technology provides another. These are not 
part of what science is to a scientist. No matter how convincing a blurry 
photograph of a UFO may seem, it does not provide sufficient real evidence to 
prove the existence of extra-terrestrial life. However, machines and measures can
be made up to look scientific and that "evidence" is convincing to many. 
Additionally, applications of science can go wrong, but that is a separate issue 
from the value of the enterprise as a whole. The cultural conception of science as 
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different from that of the scientist will become even more clear by looking at anti-
science attitudes in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE THREAT OF SCIENCE: NEGATIVE ATTITUDES
TOWARD SCIENCE
The film study shows that there exist conflicted views towards scientists. 
Shown as the protagonists, they clearly are good enough to be worthy of the 
hero's quest. However, we also see that they are endowed with a significant 
number of negative characteristics. They are absent-minded, work-focused, anti-
social, and anti-spiritual. They create problems that cannot be resolved through 
the use of science alone. These same themes are reflected in the anti-science 
factor. This factor mirrors all of the fears that are expressed in the movies and 
other forms of popular culture: that science will run amok, that it is anti-human, 
that it denies the reality the public experiences.
This factor clearly shows the negative side of the divided image that science 
and scientists maintain in this culture. It isn't an ambiguous image. People are 
clearly and coherently maintaining negative attitudes towards science at the same
time that they maintain positive attitudes towards science. Some of these 
negative attitudes have to do with real and tangible concerns about a 
technological - rather than scientific - society and its ills. However, because 
technology and science are inextricably linked, people do not differentiate 
between the two and science becomes the symbolic representative of all that is 
negative about the organization of modern life. We see environmental 
destruction, technology that we perceive as ruling our lives, the rejection of 
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religious beliefs, and even the destruction of community. We yearn for what we 
imagine to be a better life, a slower pace, and a greater sense of meaning. The lack
of these is blamed on the nature of science.
Describing the Anti-Science Factor
The questions that load on this factor can be broken into five basic categories:
religion vs. science, the dangers of science, science degrades our lifestyle, 
pseudoscience, and scientists as outcasts. The first four categories come together 
to signify attitudes that relate directly to concerns about modernity. This is where
science is specifically and clearly attributed as the agent of negative change. The 
last category deals with scientists rather than science, and hence moves from 
production to producers. As the human representatives of an enterprise which 
clearly is more than the sum of its parts, scientists are seen as different and 
distant from the world of the normal and the normative.
Religion vs. Science
The religion versus science issue is well known. Science is often posited as the 
opposite of religion. This comes in part from the scientific community, most 
recently from Dawkins (2006), but also from many other sources (e.g.,  Freud, 
1961; White, 1993; Draper, 2007). The religious community has also attacked the 
scientific community. Creation science is only the latest attack, although it 
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involves the interesting use of the outward trappings of science to attack science.2
The "Intelligent Design Network" argues on the front page of its website (http:/
/www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/) that the problem with the institution of 
science is that it lacks objectivity. The implication is that, were it to be objective it
would recognize the validity of intelligent design. Ironically, this same page states
that "[i]n a broader sense, Intelligent Design is simply the science of design 
detection -- how to recognize patterns arranged by an intelligent cause for a 
purpose." There is no sense of irony in this description. The fact that this 
statement carries with it an assumption about cause and effect that violates the 
nature of objective research is not acknowledged. Hence, science as practiced is 
attacked by an easy-to-explain tenet of science divorced from the larger method.
However, over the last half century the essential nature of this divide has been
questioned, most notably by historians of science (e.g., Ferngren, 2002) and 
religion. They note that science and religion have had multiple modes of 
interaction including conflict, but they have also ignored each other, and at times 
collaborated. The common assumption that religion and science are inherently at 
odds and have always been at odds is an interesting cultural indicator. While it is 
not surprising that the general populace has not read the scholarly material on 
the issue, the persistence of this belief is yet another indicator of the conflicted 
view that this society has about science. What better to oppose the most visible 
2. One example of this can be found at the Center for Scientific Creation. 
www.creationscience.com
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symbol of modernity than religion? Rationality and spirituality are easy to pit 
against each other in a simplistic dualistic manner.
In this survey there are two questions about religion. The first represents the 
central divide that is perceived to exist between science and religion. Question H3
asks whether respondents agree with the statement "We depend too much on 
science and not enough on faith." The second question (L8) explores perceptions 
regarding the practitioners of science  by asking about agreement with the 
statement "Scientists are not likely to be very religious people." 
The accuracy or inaccuracy of the latter assumption is not central here. It is 
unlikely that the vast majority of people are aware of the true religious beliefs of 
most scientists. What is important is that they perceive them to be less religious. 
While it is true that scientists are less likely to hold religious beliefs than to hold 
them, (Larson and Witham, 1998; Larson et al., 1999; Leuba, 2006), recent data 
show that roughly 40% (Larson and Witham, 1997) of scientists believe in God. 
In contrast, it has been widely reported that Americans are highly religious. A 
recent Harris Poll (2005) reported that 82% of Americans believe in God. 
However, this number is likely to be overstated. Demerath (2001) notes that polls
about religious beliefs are highly sensitive to question wording. This is because of 
the ambiguity of the nature of religious beliefs.  He points out that the idea of 
religious belief is also about cultural identity, which is broader and more 
complicated than a rational assessment of whether one believes in God. 
Ultimately,  it could be argued that respondents who say that scientists are 
not likely to be religious are correct. However, that would miss the complexity 
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and culturally symbolic nature of the belief. People's own beliefs and even church 
attendance (Hadaway et al., 1993; Smith, 1998) are likely to be tied up in social 
expectations for beliefs and behaviors. This relates directly to their attitudes 
towards science and religion. All three aspects here, science, religious beliefs, and
social expectations, come together to enhance the notion of the science-religion 
divide.
The Dangers of Science
The danger category deals with another fundamental concern that is played 
over and over again in films: the destructive potential of science. There is an 
entire sub-genre of science fiction films that addresses the scientific experiment 
gone awry. In the film study in Chapter Three, examples of this type of film 
ranged from comedies (Honey, I Blew Up the Kid) to horror (Man's Best Friend).
This theme is endemic, even though real lab accidents of this kind are almost 
non-existent. Hence, this theme is directly related to the larger issues behind 
such concerns about science, rather than any connection to reality. 
The first danger question (H9) that loaded on this factor asked respondents to
agree or disagree with the statement "Technological discoveries will eventually 
destroy the earth." This is a direct translation of the cataclysmic view of science. 
Additionally, respondents were asked if the harmful results of science were 
greater than the benefits (I2). Depending on the response to that question, people
were asked a follow up question. Those who thought that the harm was greater 
were asked if the harm (I2B) was slightly or strongly greater than the benefits. 
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The same type of question was asked for those who thought the benefits were 
greater than the harm (I2A). Only the follow-up relative level of harm question 
(I2B) was part of the anti-science factor. 
Science Degrades Our Lifestyle
We see yet another common theme with regard to science that expresses 
concern with the degradation of our lifestyle. It is here that science is most clearly
blamed for the perceived negative outcomes of modernity. In the three 
statements in this group, "Science makes our way of life change too fast"  (H8), 
"Technological development creates an artificial and inhuman way of living" 
(H12), and "People would do better by living a simpler life without so much 
technology" (H15), we see the longing for an idealized pre-industrial life (at least 
in part) that comes without some of the complications from technology. This 
theme of the pastoral, perfect life is no less alive than it was during the Industrial 
Revolution. The inhumane nature of clock watching, the dislocation of 
individuals from family, and the effects of industrial pollution are just some of 
the criticisms of the modern world. These criticisms are always made in 
comparison to some better past, without recognition of the improvements that 
have accompanied them.
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Pseudoscience
The next group of questions that load on the anti-science factor is about 
pseudoscience. It is not surprising that lucky numbers, "Some numbers are 
especially lucky for some people" (H7), belief in aliens, "Some of the unidentified 
flying objects that have been reported are really space vehicles from other 
civilizations" (H16) and astrology, "Would you say that astrology is very scientific,
sort of scientific, or not at all scientific?" (P3) are connected to other anti-
scientific attitudes. While an anti-scientific attitude is not a prerequisite for 
maintaining these ideas, it does predispose the individual against looking 
skeptically at them. 
Ironically, as in the case for science vs. religion, the trappings of science are 
often used to justify pseudoscience. As we saw in the pro-science factor, people 
who believe in these things can be pro-science. For example, the television show 
Ghost Hunters is a purported documentary of scientific investigations of haunted 
houses. The two investigators enter the house with "scientific" instruments to 
measure paranormal activity. Again, we see a potential separation between the 
ideology of science as practiced, and science as method. Despite the fact that 
there may not be a clear understanding of scientific methodology, people 
continue to use its outward trappings to "prove" or justify their beliefs. In fact, in 
the paranormal world one of the basic tenets of the scientific methodology is 
often violated when practitioners claim that the phenomena in question cannot 
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be manifest in front of non-believers. This partial application of the scientific 
method is not seen as flawed by its adherents because they see science in a 
cultural, rather than methodological manner.
Scientists as Outcasts
Moving from science to the producers of science, the factor includes 
statements that show a similar stereotypical impression of scientists as outcasts - 
an impression that was already made clear by the film study. We see scientists as 
loners, "A scientist usually works alone" (L1), who engage in risky work, 
"Scientific work is dangerous" (L2), who are socially backward, "Scientists are apt
to be odd and peculiar people" (L6), and are work obsessed, "Scientists have few 
other interests but their work" (L9) to the point where they miss the rest of life, 
"Scientists don't get as much fun out of life as other people do" (L4). The scientist
as socially disconnected lab-rat is a powerful stereotype that separates the 
scientists into their role as "other." The work that they do makes them inherently 
different (or they do that work because they are different) and distances science 
further from the "average Joe."
Religion and Other Fears About Modernity Seen in the Factor
In effect, this factor is a compilation of anti-science beliefs that exist in the 
general populace. Anti-science is not a partisan phenomenon. There are right-
wing social conservative perspectives in the religious questions. There are left-
wing perspectives in the concerns about the pace of life, and the dangers of 
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science.  Using these two types of anti-science sentiments we can see overlapping,
but still distinct, attitudinal groups. Not surprisingly, we see a clear split around 
the issue of religion.
Dividing the modernity questions3 up by the response to the faith question 
shows that there are two strong groups. The first group is comprised of those who
believe that we need more faith. For respondents who are highly anti-science 
(scored above the median on the anti-science factor), a strong majority (59.1%) 
agree that we need more faith. This compares to 36.7% of those who scored below
the median.  
The second group does not think we need more faith, but feels that there are 
other problems. Looking at the danger category, we see that there is great 
concern about the potential for destruction and the degradation of our lifestyle, 
28.5% of those who are highly anti-science profess some degree of these concerns
about the organization of our current society. This compares to 25.7% who scored
below the median. 
These are not minor worries that exist in one part of the population. They are 
widespread concerns about the nature of modern society that are being expressed
through concerns about science. However, the religious concerns are clearly more
aligned with an anti-science attitude than are the more general concerns about 
the way we live and our potential future.
3. Religion vs. science, the dangers of science, science degrades our lifestyle,
and pseudoscience.
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Overall, there is fairly broad concern about science and the nature of 
modernity. Only one tenth of the weighted sample disagreed with all of the 
statements in all of the four categories (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). Just under 
one fifth of the population (18.4%) have concerns about all four of the categories4.
The mistrust of science and the belief that it may be taking us in the wrong 
direction is not a minority belief.
Table 5.1: Anti-Science Modernity Categories
Category Questions
Religion vs. Science H3: We depend too much on Science and not enough on
faith.
L8: Scientist are not likely to be very religious people.
Dangers of Science H9: Technological discoveries will eventually destroy 
the earth.
I2B: If I1 (Science causes harm or benifit) is harm, 
strongly or slightly
Lifestyle H8: Science makes our way of life change too fast.
H12: Technological development creates an artificial 
and inhuman way of living.
H15: People would do better by living a simpler life 
without so much technology.
Pseudoscience H7: Some numbers are especially lucky for some people.
H16: Some of the unidentified flying objects that have 
been reported are really space vehicles from other 
civilizations.
P3: Would you say that astrology is very scientific, sort 
of scientific, or not at all scientific?
We also see a high level of agreement with the stereotypical portrayal of 
scientists. Two thirds of the weighted sample (66.1%) agree with at least one of 
4. Measured by agreement with one or more questions in that category.
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the four statements. While only a small number (4.4%) agree with all four,  there 
is a broad consensus with the image of a socially inept, lab-rat, atheistic, oddball 
scientist that exists in American film portrayals.
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Figure 5.1: Modernity Categories Agreed with
When this factor is scored, those who are generally anti-science (score 
positively) is almost as great as those who (47% vs. 53%) generally disagree with 
the anti-science perspective (score negatively). In fact, 94% agree with at least 
one of the questions in this factor. Eighty-six percent of people who score 
negatively on this factor agree with at least one question. Looking just at the 
questions about the merits and dangers of science5, 73% agree with at least one of
5. H3: We depend too much on science and not enough on faith.
H8: Science makes our way of life change too fast.
H9: Technological discoveries will eventually destroy the earth.
H12: Technological development creates an artificial and inhuman way of living.
H15: People would do better by living a simpler life without so much technology.
I2B: If I1 (Science causes harm or benefit) is harm, strongly or slightly
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the questions. This breaks down into 57% for the negative scorers and 86% for 
the positive scorers. Hence, while the scores tell us that about half of the people 
have significant anti-science views, the individual questions show that parts of 
these views exist even in people who do not measure as highly anti-science.
While there is broad overall agreement with at least some part of the anti-
science factor, there are differences that can be picked out of the data. Looking 
only at those people who have the highest and lowest factor scores, we can see 
differences in responses. As before, separating out these two groups allows a 
clearer look at those with strong, consistent attitudes. It shows the limits on both 
ends of the spectrum. In Table 5.2 respondents have been separated into those  
whose factor score is one standard deviation below the mean, and those whose 
factor score is one standard deviation above the mean. By looking at the 
agreement6 for each question we can start to see some of what differentiates 
people with regard to anti-science beliefs.
The largest difference in the level of agreement (57.7%) between people who 
score low on the anti-science factor and people who score high involves whether 
life changes too fast. The speed of change in society has been an issue for a long 
time. Clearly, this is a dividing issue for people. The next largest spread between 
the two groups comes from impressions of scientists. Both the statement about 
scientists having few other interests (55.1% difference in level of agreement) and 
the statement about scientists being odd and peculiar (52.1%) have very different 
6. Agreement here is the sum of the answers "agree" and "strongly agree."
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responses from people who score high and low. High scorers are much more 
likely to have negative attitudes towards scientists as people who may in fact 
destroy the world. Danger is the next largest difference (49.1%), followed closely 
by religion (46.9%). 
Table 5.2: Agreement with Questions for Low/High Anti-Science Factor Scores
Category Questions Low 
Scores
High 
Scores
(1 ! 
Below 
Mean)
(1 ! 
Above 
Mean)
Difference
Religion Too Much Science Not Enough 
Faith (H3)
32.4 79.2 46.9
Scientists Not Religious (L8) 15.7 55.4 39.8
Danger Tech Destroys Earth (H9) 13.2 62.4 49.1
Sci Research How Harmful (I2B) 1.5 42.1 40.6
Lifestyle Science Makes Life Change too Fast
(H8)
22.1 79.7 57.7
Tech Makes Life Artificial (H12) 16.7 58.4 41.7
Should Live Simpler Life w/o Tech 
(H15)
30.4 69.8 39.4
Scientists
as 
Outcasts
Works Alone (L1) 8.8 31.2 22.4
Work is Dangerous (L2) 37.7 80.7 43.0
Don't Get as Much Fun (L4) 3.4 46.5 43.1
Odd/Peculiar People (L6) 7.8 59.9 52.1
Few Other Interests (L9) 9.3 64.4 55.1
Pseudo-
science
Lucky Numbers (H7) 13.7 56.9 43.2
UFOs (H16) 14.2 42.1 27.9
Astrology (P3) 16.7 56.9 40.3
The key differences between those who score strongly as anti-science and 
those who score as strongly not anti-science include three of the modernity 
categories as well as the scientists category. This implies that those who are 
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strongly anti-science see science as a significantly negative influence on the 
organization of society. It is not merely a critique of the weak points of science, 
but rather addresses how science influences our daily lives. Additionally, it is not 
just the method that is problematic, it is also the producers.
Influencing The Factor: Attitudes, Beliefs, and a Bit of Knowledge
A multivariate regression was performed to examine what variables are 
associated with changes in the anti-science factor score. The scored factor is 
roughly symmetrical and not quite normally distributed (see Figure 5.2), but 
close enough for the requirements of the model (see Appendix E).
 
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of Anti-Science Factor Scores
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So what predicts the anti-science score? The independent variables can be 
broken down into four groups: knowledge, attitudes, pseudoscience, and 
demographics (see Table 5.3). The methodology vs. ideology divide is clearly 
represented here. Variables that measure knowledge have a negative effect on the
anti-science factor score. The ideological variables (attitudes and pseudoscience) 
have a positive effect on the factor score.
Table 5.3: Anti-Science Factor Regression 
Linear regression                               Number of obs =    1539
                                                F( 12,  1526) =   41.44
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                R-squared     =  0.2641
                                                Root MSE      =  .71923
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
          |             Robust
     mfs3 |    Coef.   Std. Err.    t     P>|t|    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
   EDUC3r | -.1397207  .0365648   -3.82   0.000   -.2114433   -.0679981
   CorSum | -.0217804  .0074655   -2.92   0.004   -.036424    -.0071367
     G1Ar | -.1152707  .0359001   -3.21   0.001   -.1856894   -.0448519
     G3Ar | -.0858408  .0303241   -2.83   0.005   -.1453221   -.0263596
       I3 |  .1798427  .0149307   12.05   0.000    .1505558    .2091296
      I4B |  .1305986  .0135085    9.67   0.000    .1041014    .1570957
     APEV |  .1133201  .0286058    3.96   0.000    .0572093    .1694309
      H14 |  .1003988  .0211896    4.74   0.000    .058835     .1419627
     H17c |  .1535276  .0352184    4.36   0.000    .0844459    .2226093
     H18c |  .1956006  .0580775    3.37   0.001    .0816804    .3095209
RESPAGE6r | -.0692996  .0123132   -5.63   0.000   -.0934523   -.0451469
       Q5 |  .1074888  .03733      2.88   0.004    .0342652    .1807123
    _cons | -1.050228  .2199326   -4.78   0.000   -1.48163   -.6188255
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Knowledge
Not surprisingly education (EDUC3r) is negatively associated with anti-
science sentiments. It would be strange if education had no effect, however its 
influence is not as overwhelmingly large as might be expected. The survey 
included a twenty-question test of scientific knowledge (see Appendix C). This 
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measure (CorSum) is also negatively associated with the factor score. However, 
the effect is quite mild. This is not surprising since the scores on this test are 
reasonably high (mean 14.2, median 15).
People who score high on the anti-science factor also self-assess their 
understanding of the nature of a scientific study at a low level (G1Ar).  In 
addition, the person's self assessment of their understanding of  molecule (G3Ar) 
is negatively associated, so that people who feel they do understand the concepts 
are less likely to hold anti-science views. 
There are additional variables that measure the assessment of trained raters 
(G1B-G4B) regarding the respondent's understanding of the concepts of scientific
study, DNA, molecule, and the experimental method. However, since these 
questions were not asked of people who said they had little understanding of the 
concept, they cannot be used in this model since too many cases have to be 
dropped. Despite this issue, there is little change in the effect of other variables 
on the dependent variable using either their self-assessed understanding or the 
respondent's understanding assessed by trained raters.
As noted in the discussion of the pro-science factor, these self-assessments 
are largely not accurate. Only 33% of those who rated their understanding of 
scientific study highly were seen as having a strong understanding by trained 
raters. Respondents did somewhat better with the concept of molecule. In this 
case 58% who rated their own understanding highly were seen as having a strong 
understanding by trained raters, however this represents only 7% of the entire 
sample. This tells us that accurate information, contrary to the wishes of the NSF 
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and the Royal Society, is not necessary for reducing anti-science attitudes; people
only need to believe that they understand. 
Attitudes
Moving to the ideological variables, people who think that genetic engineering
presents more risk than benefit (I3: are the risks or benefits of genetic 
engineering greater) are more likely to have high anti-science scores. 
Additionally, seeing a higher degree of risk (I4B: if the risks are greater are they 
slightly or strongly greater) is associated with a high anti-science score. How 
attentive a person is toward environmental issues (APEV), measured by how 
attentive and informed they feel they are, is also associated with a higher factor 
score. The final ideological variable measures how optimistic people are about the
ability to solve problems through technology (H14). People who do not think we 
will find new inventions "to counteract any harmful consequences of 
technological development" are more likely to have a high anti-science score.
As in the pro-science score, attitudes about genetic engineering are central 
influences in attitudes towards science. It is not entirely clear that this must be 
the case. While it is a controversial and difficult subject, it could be seen as a 
problematic aspect of this branch of science alone, rather than an indicator of 
problems with the entire enterprise. The environmental issue relates to the idea 
that science and technology, rather than the actions of everyday life, are 
responsible for environmental destruction.
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Pseudoscience
 Pseudoscience shows up again in the form of belief in ESP (H17). Those who 
agree that ESP exists are more likely to hold anti-science views. Because 
proponents use a modified version of the scientific method, and hence do not 
reject science entirely, this likely represents anger at the institution of science. It 
is not science in its entirety that they see as bad, but rather the implementation of
it, and in particular, the anti-democratic nature of scientific truth. The results 
from the pro-science factor show that pseudo-scientific beliefs are not inherently 
connected only to anti-science attitudes. Pseudoscience can be seen as scientific 
in the wider culture. As noted earlier, there are multiple television shows that 
"scientifically" prove the existence of ghosts. In the pro-science factor this type of 
belief increased pro-science attitudes, while they work in the opposite direction 
here.
The degree to which people believe in alternative medicine (H18c) has a 
strong positive effect on the anti-science factor score. This result parallels the 
general perspective that mainstream science (and the pharmaceutical companies 
in particular) ignores the wisdom of traditional cultures and their medical cures. 
This links negative attitudes seen in this factor with the theme seen in films 
where science is corrupted by big business. Here, big pharma (as it is often called 
pejoratively), works in concert with the scientific medical establishment against 
democratic knowledge. Alternative medicine works because people "know" it has 
worked.
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Demographics
There are only two demographic variables that are significant: age 
(RESPAGE6r) and sex (Q5). Older people are somewhat less likely to have high 
anti-science scores than are younger people. Whether this is a cohort or age effect
is not determinable at this point. There are logical arguments for both. The older 
generation form a cohort that grew up in the Sputnik era and was presented with 
the idea of science as savior. The younger cohort that grew up in the era of ozone 
depletion and climate change were frequently presented with science as villain. 
Alternatively, more exposure to the vagaries of the public mind and debates could
allow more perspective as we age. Interestingly, men were more likely to have 
higher anti-science scores than were women (Q5). This presents another 
contradiction to the notion that men have more positive attitudes towards science
than do women (Board, 2008, Foundation, 2002).
Summary
The anti-science factor is the embodiment of the ideological perspective on 
science. It illuminates the complicated, conflicted, non-scientific representation 
and understanding of science. It is simultaneously a criticism of science and a 
misapplication of science. This way of viewing science is cultural, not logical. 
The fact that the anti-science score is only partially responsive to education 
shows that there is more behind it than simple lack of knowledge. As we saw with 
the pro-science score, there are much more powerful influences on negative 
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attitudes towards science than knowledge. Additionally, perceived understanding
is important for reducing anti-science attitudes, but that understanding need not 
be accurate.
The anti-science factor is made up of many of the same issues that are 
inherent in the critique of modernity. The loss of community and religion, the 
destruction of the environment, and science as a danger are central aspects of 
these attitudes. These are not easily attacked by knowledge alone. They are ideas 
that are deeply embedded in our culture and are not based on rational thought so 
are not easily argued away through rational means. They are feelings about what 
should and shouldn't be and are wrapped up in what society believes science is, 
whether that perception is accurate or not.
Ultimately, despite the contradictions and complications, science is seen as 
truth. As a result it occupies a high status position in society. However, that high 
position is at odds with other cultural values and beliefs. The democratic ideal, 
yearning for an idealized past, and constant fears about the future all mix 
together to make science much more than a methodology in the minds of the 
public.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Science is science, or so many people would argue. In introductory level 
courses in colleges across the country students learn that science is a method that
revolves around falsifiability and replicability. The process requires continuous 
discussion and revision. All scientific results follow from these propositions; they 
are what gives science its special connection to truth. 
The concept of science in the general public is vastly different from this 
notion. Science is truth. However, the intricacies of the method are irrelevant. 
Science is also the bully that tries to tell people how to live: what to eat, what is 
dangerous, and what is not. It also provides a complicated moving target by 
creating expanded and sometimes conflicting results. This complexity is normal 
to the scientist, but often deeply disturbing to the general populace. There is 
simultaneous anger at the presumed authority of the information and 
lamentations regarding changing conclusions.
If the broader society understood the scientific method there would be no 
autism-vaccine controversy (see, for example, (Chen et al., 2004, DeStefano, 
2007, Honda et al., 2005, Hornig et al., 2008, Nicol, 2007). The scientific results 
are clear and have been for a long time, yet many people including celebrities 
(with Jenny McCarthy leading the way) are still arguing that vaccines cause 
autism. This is not a debate about the nuances of data or sampling method, but a 
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discourse between science and feeling. People believe that vaccines cause autism 
and are immune to data to the contrary. 
It also brings out a second conflict that revolves around the undemocratic 
nature of science: that scientific knowledge is privileged over the perceptions of 
the individual. This can also wrap into negative attitudes towards large scale 
institutions, particularly businesses. It is obvious to some that the reason science 
says that vaccines do not cause autism is that the vaccine manufacturers do not 
want to pay for the damage they have caused or spend the money they need to 
produce safe vaccines. 
The recent retraction by The Lancet (2010) of the paper  (Wakefield et al., 
1998) that sparked the controversy has reinvigorated the debate. In fact, Jenny 
McCarthy and Jim Carrey  have issued a statement (2010) on their website, 
Generation Rescue, devoted to helping children recover from autism. This 
statement argues that the paper has been criticized and ultimately retracted 
because of a scientific conspiracy led by the pharmaceutical industry. 
Dr. Wakefield has been found guilty (among many other things) of using 
funds for uses for which they were not approved, for performing some tests on 
children without ethics committee approval, and for performing tests that were 
not in the interest of a child (Council, 2010). The article had already been 
partially retracted in 2004 (Murch et al., 2004) by ten of the twelve authors 
because the conclusions were not supported by the data. Interestingly, the most 
recent retraction is being presented as scientific repudiation by both sides of the 
debate even though that had occurred in the first retraction and was not any part 
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of the current one. Scientific papers need not be correct to be published and there
are many unretracted papers where the conclusions do not hold up to further 
research. However, the complexities of the scientific method are irrelevant in this
debate. Those who truly believe in a link between vaccines and autism see this 
only as a conspiracy to censor them. McCarthy and Carrey present Wakefield as 
that maverick scientist who is fighting desperately against the scientific 
establishment in addition to avoiding the control of the pharmaceutical industry. 
In this world, evidence confirms what you believe to be true and alternate 
explanations are the work of conspiracies. The word "believe" is not used in 
typical bad application of the English language as it is when we say that scientists 
believe in evolution. When we say this we mean that scientists are assured that 
the evidence is good enough to show that evolution is an accurate description of 
how our world works. The more common use of the word believe, even in the case
of science, implies faith rather than scientific proof. For those who believe in the 
vaccine autism link there is no reliance on real evidence. This violates the 
fundamental nature of science, but the science of McCarthy and Carrey and their 
followers is not the science of scientists. In this world, anecdotes rule and 
emotional connections (especially mother love) gives you a privileged view into 
the medical reality of disease. In this case belief is evidence.
This is just one example of how science is also the lightning rod for all of our 
concerns about the nature of modernity and its attendant rationalization of life. 
Ecological ills, perceived loss of community, and loss of the pastoral among other 
negative outcomes can all be attributed to science. Science is also the cause of 
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impending doom. The iconic nuclear disaster is the most prevalent of these, but 
the lab accident by the careless scientist, or the engineered virus gone awry are 
common cultural themes.
Even so, we still valorize science. When we want to argue that soap, or 
toothpaste, or cleaners (Florman, 1981) are best we invoke science. When we 
want to prove that ghosts exist we gather scientific-looking instruments and 
measure irrelevant phenomena. The social conception of science is more than a 
love/hate relationship with the science of scientists. It is a new conception of 
science that includes, in some ways, the science of scientists, but in other ways 
rejects it entirely.
Inept scientists
The representation of scientists in film is one way in which our complicated 
and contradictory relationship to science is manifest. In film we most often see 
the scientist as the socially awkward outcast. Even when the scientist is the 
protagonist, he or she (although there are few women characters in the sample) 
has some sort of awkward characteristics, whether it is odd clothing or 
inappropriate social interactions. Scientists as secondary characters are often 
depicted as the stereotypical geeky scientist: disheveled, unkempt, and out-of-
shape. This, as much as the white lab coat, mark them as scientists. The image 
has become iconic and serves to make scientists separate from the broader 
society. They stand out because they are seen as different from most people and 
these differences are not portrayed positively.
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In addition to dressing and acting outside of societal norms, they also are 
highly likely to make life difficult for all those around them. Whether protagonist 
or antagonist, they are likely to create some problem through the use of their 
science. Whether they create a beast or unleash a supernatural murderer or cause
the destruction of an entire village in the Amazon, scientists in these films 
frequently make bad judgments that have devastating consequences. Rarely can 
they fix these through the use of science alone. Often science is not even a part of 
the solution. In fact, scientists in film frequently reject part or all of their identity 
as scientists in the end.
This portrayal of the scientist as at best an inept geek and at worst a craven 
destroyer is a distancing mechanism. It demotes the problematic people who are 
more knowledgeable to a more equal level with the rest of society. This is 
particularly true when the main character replaces science with intuition or 
mysticism. The privileged knowledge is shown to be no more valuable than the 
"gut" feelings of people in touch with their emotions or a spiritual authority.
Additionally, these movies treat the scientist as the center point of the 
problems with modernity. Alienating hierarchical knowledge denies the 
emotional by being over-rational. The lack of differentiation between science and 
technology equates the lab scientist and the inventor, either of whom can create 
something that will bring large-scale destruction to society. Medicine Man is 
most emblematic of the struggle between the modern and the pre-modern and 
takes us into the equalized knowledge of the post-modern. A cancer researcher 
gives up his lab to go on a trip around the Amazon under the tutelage of the tribal
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medicine man as the only means to find a cure for cancer. In Candyman, an 
anthropologist arrogantly ignores local knowledge about a supernatural monster, 
preferring her science, and brings death and destruction to the poor.
The degree to which these images have an effect on audiences is still up for 
debate. However, it is clear that these are accepted cultural representations of 
scientists. We watch them and accept the general premises regarding the 
characters, so they are at the very least part of our iconography.
Films, Dissonance, and Modernity
This study of film falls in the vast grey area between the sociology of culture 
and of knowledge. Mannheim sees the sociology of knowledge as the tool for 
investigating how ideas are connected to the larger social system. In fact, he 
argues that ideas are only fully understood when their social origins are 
uncovered (1936, p.2). This investigation begins an examination of how the 
authority of scientific knowledge is constructed by the film maker and 
transmitted to society. The filmmaker translates ideas into film using a code that 
is familiar to the audience. Images that make sense (the man driving fast on a 
motorcycle implies his freedom and adventurousness) are used to transmit ideas. 
It is in this way that knowledge or ideas become cultural objects. These objects, in
this case movies, become a part of the larger, often unexamined, sea of culture in 
which we live. In this way, this research falls in that place between Mannheim’s 
conception of the sociology of knowledge and Burger and Luckman's (1966) 
notion of how this part of the wider discipline “must concern itself with 
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everything that passes for “knowledge” in society (p.14).” Somewhere between 
the original idea of the film and the final transmission to the audience we have 
moved beyond the construction of an idea alone and created an idea embedded in
a cultural object. I will not attempt here to draw a line that marks where the study
of an idea ends and where the study of culture begins. The  transition from idea 
alone to embedded idea is the important artifact here rather than the delineation 
of the stages of the transition.
In concrete terms this research examines one part of a greater discourse on 
scientists which has the potential to move us towards uncovering how the images 
of scientists in the movies influence the role of science in our society. Thus, using 
Mannheim’s perspective, the sociology of knowledge end of this work is not 
merely an unmasking of (incorrect) ideologies but rather an examination of the 
connections between ideas and the social relationships that influence them 
(1936,p. 267). By investigating ideas we can find the basic concepts within a 
society that underlie the ideas. These underlying concepts may not at first be 
obvious. For example, a scientist who is shown as uncoordinated and ill at ease 
socially implies something about the expected personality type of scientists. 
However, this idea of the scientist can also convey ideas about how we feel about 
science and even how we feel about knowledge acquisition itself. On the surface 
only the scientist is discussed, but when the image is fully explored it can be tied 
to larger ideas held by at least part of society, such as anti-intellectualism or anti-
modernism. Only through investigating different loci can the social reproduction 
and social construction of ideas be determined. Looking at this one contributing 
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factor -  the images of science in film - we can begin to put together a broader 
understanding of science's larger role in our society.
This sample of movies shows clear commonalities in the treatment and 
portrayal of scientists. The aggregate presentation constructs an overall negative 
view of the scientist. For the most part, scientists are inept bunglers who 
constantly create difficulties for society. They are clearly different from the rest of
the population and in some way more responsible for the ills of society than the 
average person. Some of this effect is due to the nature of mainstream movies, 
which require quick and easy characters that can be understood by the audience 
with minimal explanation. In this sense, the relatively stable portrayal of 
scientists is an effect of the medium. However, the fact that this portrayal is the 
standard makes real the presumed stereotype. If the stereotype did not exist the 
writers, directors and actors could not use it as a consistent type. They would 
have to create more complex portrayals that revolve around the nature of the 
scientist as a real and multifaceted individual. They do not need to do so because 
we recognize the stereotype. The movies then recreate and enhance this view of 
science.
This study is not intended to argue the intent of the producers. Nor is it 
designed to measure the effect of movies on audiences. Although there is no 
consensus on the effects of film on the viewer, there are many different types of 
research that show that media messages do have an effect on the audience. 
Whether one is arguing that constant exposure to similar messages has a 
cumulative effect on the beliefs and behaviors of the viewer (see Gerbner, 1984, 
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for example) or that violent shows can influence the behavior of children (Felson,
1996), there is a reasonable consensus that media do influence how we see our 
world. On the particular issue of scientists in the media, Gerbner (1987) found 
that heavy viewers of television are more likely to to hold negative views towards 
science. They are more likely to see scientists as odd and peculiar, to see scientific
work as dangerous and to see scientists as people with little connection to family 
and high connection to work. 
While it is clear that film is not merely a reflection of our society, films can tell
us something about societal views on the nature of science and scientists. Only 
two out of twenty movies had reasonably positive characterizations of the main 
character scientist. It is ironic that during this same time period at least three 
movies7  portrayed lawyers as saviors or heroes. Lawyers are currently the 
prototypical disliked profession, even if one only takes into account the number 
of anti-lawyer jokes. 
The portrayal of scientists in films of this era does not mean that scientists are
loathed by society as a whole. From 1979 to 1999 the proportion of people who 
feel that the benefits from science outweigh the harm has been at least 70%, 
except for 1985 when it fell to 68% (National Science Board, 2000). This 
confidence in science as an institution also extends to the leadership of the 
institution. The proportion of those surveyed who expressed a great deal of 
confidence in science has fluctuated around forty percent between 1973 and 
7.  My Cousin Vinny, A Few Good Men, and The Pelican Brief all were released during the same 
time period. All of these movies show lawyers protecting society in some way rather than 
destroying it, unlike the consequences shown of scientists performing their jobs.
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1988. This places it second only to medicine among the institutions ranked 
(medicine, the scientific community, the supreme court, education, the press, 
television, and organized labor). Scientists themselves also enjoy a high level of 
prestige. As noted previously, in the 1989 General Social Survey scientists rated a 
prestige score of 73 out of 100 (Davis, 1991). This ranks them higher than 
clergymen (67 out of 100). These large scale measures show an overall positive 
view. The NSF data used for the public opinion portion of this work both reflects 
and moderates this data. This survey shows that there are widely positive 
attitudes towards scientists,  even though there are significant negative 
impressions about the nature of scientists. This raises the question of why 
scientists are portrayed so negatively in film. 
 Scientists in film represent more than a stereotype of one specialized role; 
they are parts of a larger discussion about knowledge and the place it holds in 
society. In particular, they address common themes with regard to the nature of 
intellectualism and modernity. Our society has had an uneasy relationship with 
intellectualism throughout its history. Richard Hofstadter analyzed the roots and 
shape of this phenomenon and saw it as a result of tension between rationalism 
and evangelicalism, as well as between both the democratic and business 
tendencies within American culture (1962). Thus, the intellect is a source of 
suspicion and derision because the rationalist tendencies violate our belief in the 
mystical, and the possibility of ranking intellectual abilities violates our 
egalitarian tendencies. Also, the need for careful, often slow deliberation violates 
the needs of business to make quick decisions. All of these issues become 
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embedded in the representation of scientists in films. In the depictions examined 
here physical force is of more value than scientific investigation, and scientists 
harm people through their inability to see the mystical. 
It is interesting to note that the business tension is the only one negatively 
represented in these movies. Here the sympathy is partially on the side of the 
scientist. The need of business to create quick, profitable solutions deforms 
science rather than science deforming business. Thus, we have the corporation in 
The Fugitive manipulating the results of medical tests and a real-estate mogul 
attempting to kill a scientist in Darkman. 
These movies also include anti-modern themes. The concern with the nature 
of modernity and its failings has been well documented (see for example 
Kolakowski, 1990). While most of the discussions of modernity occur at the 
scholarly level, these ideas also permeate the social system at many levels. One of 
the central tenets of concern about modernity is the reliance on rational thought 
rather than emotional connections. There is no better representation of rational 
thought than the scientist. We see this duality represented in several of the films 
in this sample. 
Medicine Man is perhaps the best example of this. The scientist represents 
the modern way: technology, environmental destruction, loss of community. The 
medicine man represents the pre-modern way: mystical revelation, 
environmental equilibrium, community. These parallels are made abundantly 
clear in the movie. Progress is represented by the technology that prevents Dr. 
Campbell from seeing the mystical answer. Environmental destruction due to 
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progress is represented bluntly by bulldozers knocking down the rain forest to 
build roads. Before his transformation Dr. Campbell inadvertently contributes to 
the destruction by accidentally helping to burn the home of the native tribe. He is 
the prototypical representation of the ills of modernity. Similar themes are part of
Candyman, where the invasive scientist destroys the fragile community in the 
projects by evoking a demon. Finally, in Little Man Tate  the overly rational 
scientist must learn to love before she can continue her work.
Through the issue of rationalism the themes of anti-intellectualism and anti-
modernity intersect. Clearly, these concepts do not exist only in the realm of 
movies about scientists. A central concern about the negative effects of 
modernity, for example, is the loss of community: Celebration, Florida and other 
planned communities are physical representations of the ideological concern. 
Hence, what we see in these movies represents what exists in the wider society. 
The writers and directors, then, are not creating new ideas, but rather making 
ideas that are already extant more real through film.
These concerns about modernity move us into a post-modern frame of 
reference. In this view, science no longer holds a privileged position with regard 
to knowledge. Meta-narratives are discredited, local knowledge is privileged, and 
multiple types of knowledge are equivalent (or not comparable). While there is 
more concern about modernity represented in the films (perhaps a lag in 
transmission from academic to film writers), these themes do appear. Clearly, 
this is a central theme of Medicine Man. The native knowledge is equivalent to 
his. We also see strands of this in Stargate where the inhabitants of the alien 
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planet use their knowledge to help the clearly scientifically and technologically 
superior team from Earth. 
The ambiguity in public attitudes towards science and towards scientists 
parallels American attitudes towards technology. In fact, as Robert Wuthnow 
(1988) argued, technology has become, for many, a secular religion. He notes that
we often confuse science and technology in nomenclature so that the word 
science becomes a substitute for technological advancement. Thus we claim to 
prefer a scientifically improved toothpaste when we in fact prefer a 
technologically improved toothpaste. Conversely, Florman (1981) notes the ways 
in which we have begun to blame technology for our social ills. We feel that 
technology is out of control: it has begun to control us rather than being under 
our control.
The representation of scientists within movies is part of a counterbalancing 
discourse. The high regard we hold for science and scientists is one part of the 
societal consciousness and the representation of scientists in film is another. We 
both love and hate what they can do for us and to us. This is in part because, as 
Hofstadter (1963) argued, we are uncomfortable with hierarchy and superior 
knowledge. These two elements conflict with our radical notions of equality; 
therefore, we must find ways to diminish the authority of those who may have 
knowledge that discomforts us. On the other hand, we still value knowledge and 
the intellect. In investigating these images we can start to illuminate the different 
forces that either enhance the reputation of science and scientists or devalue 
them. 
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This type of balancing is a result of two contradictory cultural values. In this 
case, equality conflicts with progress and the meritocracy inherent in the 
scientific world. The complexity, duration, and societal embeddedness of this 
type of discourse is related to the seriousness of the conflict. There is no way to 
reconcile these concepts. Hence,  we are uncomfortable with contradiction, we 
need to manage the conflict. This occurs through the elaboration of the scientist 
as flawed. We need not fear the scientific world’s rejection of all opinions as 
equivalent because we can see that they are not perfect. Additionally, we can see 
that science is not the all encompassing force because there are answers it cannot 
give. This allows the concept of equality to stand. Scientists are not better than 
other people and they are not better at dealing with the problems of the world.
This is similar to Festinger’s (1957) concept of cognitive dissonance. He 
argues that when an individual is confronted with two conflicting options or 
concepts, that individual will face a psychological tension that motivates the 
individual to reduce that tension. Hence, in his classic example, a person who is 
planning a picnic only to find that it is raining faces an uncomfortable 
psychological state of conflict that he or she will attempt to resolve. This process 
can take many forms: changing a behavioral cognitive element, changing an 
environmental cognitive element or adding new cognitive elements. Thus, an 
individual may change a behavioral element by canceling the picnic plans, an 
environmental element by having the picnic indoors, or add new cognitive 
elements by getting a weather report that notes the rain will stop before it is time 
for the picnic. We can construct a similar concept for the societal, rather than the 
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individual, level. There are conflicts at the societal level that parallel the conflicts 
at the individual level. The two values, for example, of freedom and safety often 
conflict. We want to feel safe in our cities but we do not necessarily like the idea 
of the constant surveillance that would increase our safety but reduce our 
freedom. Hence we have what I would call societal dissonance. 
However, because society is made up of a mass of individuals that may place 
different weights on these two values we are unable to simply resolve this issue as
an individual would. The techniques that work at the level of the individual will 
not necessarily work at the level of the society. I propose that the countervailing 
discourse is one mechanism that allows us to accept the societal dissonance of the
two very different value systems inherent in our love/hate (or perhaps love/
resent) relationship with scientists. We believe that science is a valuable asset to 
society and we give scientists a high level of status. On the other hand, the 
extremely hierarchical nature of scientific knowledge (not all viewpoints are 
equal and some answers are clearly better than others) contradicts our notion 
that every individual has an equal value in any situation. This dissonance can 
partially be resolved by placing a contradictory image of the scientist in the public
view. I do not mean to imply that this is a purposeful attempt on the part of the 
movie makers, but that it functions to manage the dissonance. Clearly, this 
mechanism does not remove the original dissonance between the values of 
progress and individualism. It merely serves as a means to release some of the 
tension. Effectively, it allows the society to reject the tension by placing scientists 
in another category that makes them less problematic. Thus, while the original 
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dissonance still exists, the countervailing discourse allows society to displace the 
conflict. 
We can see this phenomenon in other places. The debate about the 
appropriateness of homosexuality deals with the values of our society but at a less
fundamental level. I do not intend to imply that these are less deeply held values. 
Instead, I mean that the values involved in this debate are less central to the 
functioning of our society as it exists currently. Hence, while homosexuality is 
more prominent in our cultural representations than it has been in the past, we 
still see some counterbalancing discourse. Will and Grace, a television situation 
comedy about a gay man is an excellent example of this. The show contrasts the 
“normal” gay man, Will, with the stereotypical gay man, Jack. This allows the 
show to balance any tendency to offend by presenting homosexuality as normal 
and acceptable with the notion that gay men are in fact different. There is not the 
inherent conflict of values here that exists for the scientist and thus the 
dissonance could be resolved through a change in the value system of society. 
This could be accomplished either through a greater acceptance of homosexuality
or by a greater degree of censure of homosexuality. Either way, the current 
tension between groups who find homosexuality acceptable and who find it 
unacceptable is moderated by maintaining both a new and positive image and a 
stereotypical  image that maintains the idea of difference.
However, the representation of scientists goes beyond a simple reflection of 
concerns in society. First, it is a representation of scientists that says little in 
about the nature of science itself. The concerns presented really only represent 
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the application of science. These films do not generally have the conceptual 
complexity to deal with issues about science. Interestingly, while level does 
moderate the degree to which scientists are stereotypically portrayed, it does not 
change the overall presentation of scientists as problematic outsiders. 
Ultimately, the portrayals of scientists in these movies are part of a larger 
complex of discourses throughout society that act in different directions to either 
enhance the social authority of science and scientists or to decrease it. This 
conceptualization relates to the point made by Swidler and Arditi (1994) that the 
sociology of knowledge has not yet truly investigated the issue of the 
authoritativeness of different types of knowledge. They ask what it means for 
knowledge to be authoritative and, since we know that social authority structures 
knowledge, how authorities actually control knowledge. Along this line, we can 
investigate not only how authorities influence the authoritativeness of knowledge 
but how all participants in the process, from the scientists themselves, to the 
movie makers, to the politicians, to the general public, influence it. Thus, films 
become but one aspect of a greater phenomenon that determines to what degree 
science remains, overall, socially authoritative.
Science reporting in the news, government regulations and funding of 
science, science publishing, publishing about science, popular conceptions of 
science,  the way science is taught and representations in film and television are 
all interconnected and construct a larger public discourse on science. The 
outcomes of this discourse determine the overall authority of science. Obviously, 
there is no end to the discourse, but if the overall magnitudes and directions of 
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the different parts of this discourse were measured, we could create a multi-
dimensional social authority scale. This scale could then tell us what segments of 
society see scientific knowledge as authoritative and to what degree. Thus, this 
work can be seen as part of a larger effort to understand the ways in which 
different discourses influence how scientific knowledge is perceived.
I use authority here not to mean an epistemological certainty, or even a 
scientifically proven fact. Rather, I am referring to the degree to which science is 
perceived within society as a subject that can reasonably tell us something about 
our world. We know that science has some social authority because it is seen by 
more people as authoritative than stories about witchcraft. Similarly, I am not 
referring to the authority of the individual who proclaims the knowledge. While 
this would be a fruitful outgrowth of this work (i.e., how authority of knowledge 
and authority of person interact), it is beyond its current scope.
Describing the ways in which formal knowledge maintains or loses its 
authority is still not a simple process. Knowledge gains or loses its authority in 
the wider sphere through a series of discourses that occur simultaneously. These 
discourses occur at different levels of authority and expertise. The discussion that
is constructed by the scientists themselves is broken into many levels that, while 
difficult for the outsider to perceive, are significantly hierarchical. The discussion 
on the popular level is similarly divided and imbued with a hierarchy of authority.
For example, Nova  on PBS maintains a higher level of authority than does any 
science that may be seen in most of the movies in this sample. Despite the 
existence of these different levels of accuracy or authority, all of the discourses 
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impact each other. Movies are often used in more authoritative sources. Jurassic 
Park, to cite an example that falls outside of this study, is often the starting point 
for serious programs on paleontology. Star Trek is used as a comparison for 
discussions of scientific and technological progress. Clearly, movies are not 
limited in their effect on the more wide ranging issue of authority of knowledge. 
Ultimately, we need to understand the interaction of these different levels of 
discourse to understand how knowledge gains authority with the producers of 
knowledge, with the intellectual elite and within the mass culture.
Some discourses will not impact significantly the production of knowledge 
because they come in “below the radar”. For example, when horoscopes are only 
seen on the amusements page of the newspaper next to the comics they are 
unlikely to affect science in any great degree. When astrologers and psychics are 
advertised on television on a regular basis, they are more likely to make an 
impact. Even if they only divert attention away from other matters, forcing 
scientists to discuss why and how astrology is not scientifically based, they have 
affected the discourse.
We must also be aware that there may be a difference between attacks on the 
culture of the knowledge producers and attacks on the knowledge itself. However,
a concerted attack on the culture of one profession is most often also an attack on
the knowledge or system they represent. Attacks on knowledge require a 
sophistication of analysis and presentation that are not always appropriate for 
particular forms of expression. Thus, we don’t expect an average Saturday 
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morning cartoon to make a distinction between the crazy white haired scientist as
odd and his ideas as troubling.
The audience studies cited earlier make it clear that viewers are influenced by 
what they see on screen. This alone implies that these movies influence at least 
the discourse of part of the viewing audience. It would surprise no one if a 
scientifically unsophisticated person saw Jurassic Park as a real possibility. It 
would probably be accurate to say that this person would have only a small effect 
on the societally perceived authority of science. However, the belief that science 
will restore dinosaurs will affect science if the number of people who believe it 
hits some critical level. Scientists will have to spend time explaining to the public 
why this cannot happen; even if the experts are reluctant to do so, journalists will 
approach them in order to get their opinion. Television shows will address this 
issue. In fact, this discourse even influences scientists. Dixon (1986) reports a 
conversation at a meeting of the American Society for Microbiology where a 
group of scientists confused the events that occurred at Three Mile Island with 
the movie The China Syndrome. Clearly, the information in movies about science 
will be even more difficult for non-scientists to separate from fact.
Conflicting attitudes
As noted above, scientists are more respected by the public than the film 
images would suggest. It is unclear exactly to what degree the film images overlap
the real world images, but it is clear that the portrayal of scientists in film is more
negative than that held by the general public. However, the themes that the 
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movies represent do come across in the survey data. Concerns about modernity, 
about religion, and the moral and ethical outcomes of science (particularly with 
respect to genetic engineering) are well represented in the survey data. In this 
case they are not attributed directly to the scientist as they are in the film 
representations. The NSF question set does not entirely allow for a full test of the 
connection between these concerns and the public opinion of scientists. 
The survey data shows that there are negative characteristics attributed to 
scientists along with the very positive images represented in more gross level 
measures such as occupational prestige. Scientists are seen as odd loners, who 
are exclusively invested in their work. However, in the survey data the concerns 
are better measured with respect to science and technology as a whole. 
Additionally, the fact that films direct their concern toward individuals is part of 
the nature of the medium. Large scale abstract concepts are difficult to represent 
outside the actions of a character and are highly unlikely to be found in 
mainstream movies. So, the apparent contradiction between the film and the 
public appreciation of scientists is both real and not real. The contradiction is real
because films bundle all of the concerns about science into the role of the 
scientist. It is not real because there are very evident negative attitudes towards 
scientists that can be uncovered with a bit of digging. We know we respect 
scientists, but we also are deeply suspicious of them as different.
In addition to concern about these grand themes, we see that attitudes 
towards science are complex and multi-dimensional. They are not simply (as 
some would hope) a reflection of a person's knowledge of science. They represent 
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a mix of broader attitudes, knowledge, stereotypes of scientists, and belief in 
pseudoscience. Science as a concept, science as practiced, and the perceived 
nature of the scientist underpins the complexity of these results.
Ultimately, attitudes towards science are not entirely rational. Belief in 
pseudoscience is connected to both positive and negative attitudes towards 
science. This is the ultimate contradiction if one assumes that attitudes towards 
science (or at least positive attitudes) are based in true understanding of science. 
The assessment of understanding by trained raters from the NSF data shows that 
the vast majority of the sample do not understand some of the most basic 
concepts behind science. This might point to a connection between knowledge 
and negative attitudes towards science. However, knowledge and education have 
only a small effect on both positive and negative attitudes towards science. 
Not only are these attitudes not directly connected to scientific knowledge,  
they are also not mutually exclusive. Pro and anti-science attitudes, as measured 
here, can be held simultaneously. The factor analysis shows that people can be 
deeply supportive of science and its potential while still being highly concerned 
about the real and presumed negative effects of science. If the attitudes as 
measured here represented clearly rational assessments, or were largely 
connected to levels of education, then this could be representative of a coherent 
critique that might be made by scientists themselves. Since this is not the case it 
leaves the cultural understanding of science and its attendant ideological factors 
the underlying source. 
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Methodology vs. Cultural Conceptions
Science in the public eye is not just a methodology. It is a broader cultural 
concept that gets used as a measure of truth, but not necessarily in the way that 
scientists intend it to be. Invoking science is a quasi-mystical process that is used 
to justify what we want to be true regardless of the real state of the evidence. This 
is why the label "clinically proven" is included in every ad for diet supplements, 
vitamins, and other over the counter remedies. We do believe that science can 
give us accurate data, at least until it contradicts our deeply held beliefs, and then
we reach for emotion or intuition - but we want to use science to prove that our 
intuition or emotion has led us to the correct answer. Often in these cases we 
reach towards other reasons for our conflict with science. Most often this comes 
down to institutional influences or the unwillingness of science to include 
emotion in the analysis (despite the implied contradiction).
The fact that science as a cultural construct is different from science as a 
methodology leads to some difficult results for the public understanding of 
science. The debate that is going on about how to increase the public's ability to 
understand, use, and evaluate scientific results (e.g., Allum et al., 2008, Bauer et 
al., 2007, Gregory and Lock, 2008, Miller, 1983, Miller, 2004) is missing an 
important component. Increasing knowledge or engaging the public more deeply 
in the dialog will provide some gains in support for science (although too much 
knowledge may in fact work in the reverse). However, these results are likely to 
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be temporary as the larger cultural conception of science reinvades the 
consciousness of those who have been more educated.
In order to understand the full nature of the cultural conception of science we 
need to look more deeply into what influences how these attitudes are formed. 
The current data sets are designed for examining attitudes towards science as 
something separate from science. They see these attitudes only as a 
misunderstanding of science. This is clearly reflected in the debate over what is 
the right set of science content questions to ask (Pardo and Calvo, 2004). Often 
the implication is that if we can get the right set of questions we could connect 
knowledge to attitudes toward science more strongly than we have been able to. 
People who know science, by this way of thinking, would presumably have more 
positive attitudes toward science or at least support important research, a 
proposition that I would argue is quite unlikely. What many see as mere 
misunderstanding are really part of what the culture sees as science. 
Hence, we need to develop data that starts with the notion that there is a 
different use of the term science than that used by the scientist. This type of 
question would focus not on the level of scientific knowledge of the respondent, 
but would look at how they think science works. The questions that ask people to 
explain scientific methodology are a good start, but they need to be directed 
towards examining the patterns of differing conceptions rather than solely 
measuring their correspondence to the scientific definition. Connecting this to 
how people perceive the results of scientific research both in general and for 
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specific well-known cases would start to show how the common use of science 
functions.
The next logical step is to move towards finding varieties of the cultural 
conception as I discuss in more detail below. Two clear themes emerge from this 
data: religion and anti-technology. These two  represent different, possibly 
overlapping cultural conceptions of science that are largely negative. Are there 
other themes that can be associated with different varieties of positive and 
negative perceptions of science? Are any of these more or less influenced by 
education?
The issue of religion is particularly salient with the growing appropriation of 
the name, but not the methodology, of science to combat the theory of evolution. 
The Intelligent Design (ID) movement has been able to at least introduce the 
notion of ID as an alternate theory in many school districts, most notably in 
Dover, Pennsylvania. This is the culmination of the cultural use of science. It 
combines both misunderstanding of science and the appropriation of the idea, 
but not the methodology. The Dover School District required that all ninth grade 
biology teachers read a statement about ID as a competing theory to evolution 
which included the following:
Because Darwin’s Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new 
evidence is discovered.  The Theory is not a fact.  Gaps in the Theory exist
for which there is no evidence.  A theory is defined as a well-tested 
explanation that unifies a broad range of observations. (Kitzmiller v. 
Dover Area School District)
This statement both correctly and incorrectly defines the idea of a scientific 
theory. The final statement is an accurate representation of a scientific theory. It 
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is directly contradicted by the understanding of theory implied in the first 
sentence. The idea that something is "just a theory" is a common misconception 
that is frequently applied to evolution (Branch and Mead, 2008). Describing any 
scientific theory in this way implies that it is an hypothesis rather than a large 
collection of substantially tested results that are collected together to form an 
explanation of a phenomena. While scientific theories can be challenged, they are
challenged based on significant data that also been substantially tested and 
validated. Hence, a scientific theory is not easily or trivially dismissed by some 
alternate data, nor can it be characterized as an hypothesis.
This cultural use of the word theory is only the beginning of the complex 
relationship between the science of evolution and the cultural conception of 
science. Teaching evolutionary theory is far from a guarantee that people will see 
evolution as true. Students who understand evolutionary theory do not always 
acept that it is true (for example, BREM et al., 2003 Shtulman, 2006, Sinatra et 
al., 2003) and people who accept evolution as true often don't understand it 
(Shtulman, 2006).
More recent research by Shtulman (2008) shows that targeted teaching can 
increase the level of acceptance, although not perfectly. This together with Brem's
(2003) research that finds that students who understand, but do not believe in 
evolution are concerned about the impact of the ideas behind evolution, linking 
them to "decreasing spirituality, increasing selfishness and racism, and 
interfering with one’s sense of purpose and self-determination." (p. 181) What is 
clear here is that there is a strong cultural aspect to understanding and believing 
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in evolution even outside of Biblical literalism. Additionally, people may be 
resistant to scientific ideas if there is a significant cultural ideology that is seen as 
common sense that conflicts with the scientific information (Bloom and 
Weisberg, 2007).
In fact, the entire notion of belief in evolution is telling. The question is more 
properly stated as whether evolution is scientific fact. However, we persist in 
defining the debate between intelligent design and evolution as one of belief 
which equalizes the two perspectives. This relates back to the issue of evolution as
"just a theory" that may or may not have sufficient evidence to support it. This is, 
in fact, where the multiple knowledges of postmodernism come into play. Science
becomes just one possible way of knowing that does not necessarily have a 
privileged position as more likely to be correct in its own domain. This 
postmodern perspective on science fits right into the individualist anti-
intellectualism pointed out by Hofstadter (1963). In fact, these two ways of 
thinking interlock quite nicely to allow science its triumphs, but disallow its 
primacy when it is not convenient to the world view of the individual or groups 
that are concerned.
When science is caught between the left's suspicion of business and the right's
religious fundamentalism, science cannot help but lose. Business, as seen in the 
film study can manipulate science for its own ends. Suspicion of business can also
be seen in public opinion polls (Ipsos, 2007),  This is particularly pertinent when 
the environment or drug research are involved. This suspicion is clearly 
represented in the public consciousness as well as in film. Pharmaceutical 
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companies have only a 35% favorable rating and a 32% unfavorable rating. These 
results compare poorly to information technology (65% favorable and 6% 
unfavorable) and electronic goods (65% favorable and 7% unfavorable). We 
learned from tobacco companies (12% favorable and 63% unfavorable) that 
research can be and is suppressed for the corporate good. This does not, however,
create an entirely rational questioning of the data, but rather can create a 
nihilistic rejection of scientific data in its entirety. Ironically, the left wing critique
of fundamentalism includes a large degree of derision about the lack of 
understanding of the science behind evolution and the age of the earth even as it 
ignores science inconvenient to its own point of view by labeling it as corrupted 
by business whether there is evidence of this or not.
Mapping The Paths
While the goals set by the NSF and the Royal society for greater public 
understanding of and participation in science are reasonable and worthy, they are
also missing a major component of the problem. Attitudes towards science are 
not as malleable as one might hope. Science is a cultural concept. Hence, it is not 
a matter of simply correcting erroneous information, but rather understanding 
how science has become deeply embedded in our society as something separate 
from what scientists mean by science. 
There are several steps that need to be taken to understand the full nature of 
the cultural conception of science. The most central one looks directly at the how 
individuals conceive of science. What do they think it means to be scientific and 
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how does the process work? Do they use scientific data and how do they decide 
that something is scientific? What type of information do they use to make 
decisions? How do they weigh different types of information (e.g., emotion based,
scientific, folk wisdom)? What do they do when these sources of information 
conflict?
The next step would be to look at how science is presented in the media. 
While there are many good studies (see for example, Bauer, 2000, Clemens, 
1986, Dixon, 1986, Dornan, 1990, Nisbet et al., 2002) that examine how science 
is presented in the media, they tend to focus on news media and on direct 
representations of science. Broadening both the source and the definition of 
science would be very valuable. We need to understand how the idea of science is 
used outside of science as an institution. In fact, we need to understand what the 
idea of science outside of science as an institution is. Clearly, this is likely to vary 
by source. Articles in the New York Times will look more like the science of the 
scientific institution than will an episode of Ghost Hunters. Oprah will most 
likely include more emotion based knowledge in her coverage than will the show 
Mythbusters. Once these two issues are reasonably well understood, we are left 
with the complicated issue of examining how the popular understanding interacts
with the media understanding and the complex historical cultural concept of 
science. 
This issue, however, is not just one that is central to sociology. Most of what is
written in the public understanding of science literature implies a policy 
response. Both the NSF and the British Royal Society are working to improve the 
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public understanding of science. The common assumption underlying these 
efforts and much of the research in this area is that improving understanding will
improve attitudes towards science. There has been some good research (see for 
example, Bauer, 2000, Evans, 1995, Sturgis and Allum, 2004) that has 
questioned this assumption and found it to be false. Greater understanding can 
lead to better attitudes, but also raises the complexity of the criticism of science 
simultaneously.
Provided that the goal is not just more positive attitudes toward science, the 
first task should be to look at interventions like those used by Shtulman and 
Calabi (2008) that take into account cultural conceptions of science when 
teaching science. Their teaching intervention provided opportunities for students 
to discuss their cultural conceptions of the process of evolution while working 
toward a scientific understanding. There is also a need to look more carefully at 
the way in which science is communicated. This research is already started (see 
for example, Clemens, 1986, Gregory and Miller, 2000, Nisbet et al., 2002), but it
tends to look at how to  communicate science to present truth so that it will be 
accepted. We need to look at how the presentation of scientific information 
becomes complicated by these pre-existing cultural uses of science.
The overarching policy goal with regard to science is to genuinely improve the
democratic process. Much of what people need to know to make good decisions is
complex data often based in science. Public policy, through entities like the NSF 
and the Royal Society, is really directed towards these ends. What needs to 
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happen is to examine and revise some of the assumptions regarding how that can 
be brought about.
Ultimately, culture is difficult to manipulate to reach a desired end. The 
pervasiveness of ideas as they are embedded in everyday life make them resilient.
They are familiar and understandable and not readily discarded by most. In this 
instance, this is even more the case since the ideas of science and the ideas that 
work against a public who fully understand science are embedded in the very 
nature of modernity and the notion of post-modernity. The rationality of science 
conflicts with the religious and emotional knowledge of anti-modern tendencies. 
It also directly contradicts the presumption of multiple equivalent knowledges 
inherent in post-modern ideas. Finally, as noted by Hofstadter (1963), it conflicts 
with the individualism and egalitarian nature of our type of democracy. These 
complexities also make it a fruitful place to examine the nature of ideas as 
suggested by Mannheim (1936), an examination that should help us understand 
how these ideas in specific, and ideas in general, can be influenced by the social.
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APPENDIX  A
FILM CONTENT ANALYSIS INSTRUMENT
Revision 6
Name of Movie:  
A.  Movie Attributes
Basic plot line:
I. time Movie takes place
II. location of Movie (earth, NYC, etc.)
III. Technology Present
A. computers
B. currently available scientific 
equipment 
1. high tech (NMR, 
spectrometer, etc.)
2. low tech (bunsen burners, 
microscopes)
C. fictional scientific equipment
D. new invention
1. high tech
2. low tech
E. other
IV. Centrality of science to plot
A. central
B. tangential
C. mostly irrelevant
V. Role of science within plot (as a 
discipline)
A. positive (e.g. science benefits 
society)
B. negative (science creates problem 
to be solved)
C. neutral 
D. ambiguous (both positive and 
negative aspects)
VI. Role of use of science within plot 
(science as an institution)
A. positive (e.g. use of science 
benefits society)
B. negative (use of science creates 
problem to be solved)
C. neutral 
D. ambiguous (science creates both 
positive and negative aspects)
VII. Role of technology within plot
A. positive (e.g. technology 
benefits society)
B. negative (technology creates 
problem to be solved)
C. neutral 
D. ambiguous (both positive and 
negative aspects)
VIII.Role of use of technology within plot
A. positive (e.g. use of technology 
benefits society)
B. negative (use of technology 
creates problem to be solved)
C. neutral 
D. ambiguous (use of technology 
creates both positive and negative
aspects)
IX. Science conflicts with
A. environment
B. societal needs
C. life of individual
D. group
X.  Science saves
A. environment
B. societal needs
C. life of individual
D. group
XI. Underlying messages of movie
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II.  Basic Demographic for 
Scientist Name of Scientist:
I. Age
A. in school (graduate or 
undergraduate student),
B. young (20s, just out of school), 
C. mid-career (30s, 40s, established 
but not senior), 
D. late career (50s and older or well 
established).  
Note:  If age can be separated from 
status each will be coded 
separately.  If career and apparent
age contradict these categories 
both will be coded.
II. sex of scientist 
A. M
B. F
III. marital status of scientist
A. married
B. divorced
C. widowed
D. single
E. unknown
IV. race/ethnicity of scientists (multiple 
may apply)
A. black
B. white
C. Hispanic
D. Asian
1. Indian
2. Japanese
3. Chinese
4. Other
E. European
F. Soviet Block
G. non-human
V. personal appearance (dress, cleanliness,
neatness) 
(coding 1:  all of the time, 2:  most of the
time, 3:  about half of the time, 4: once 
or twice, 5:  never.
A. dress
1. neutral 
2. out of fashion (e.g. 
excessively short pants, 
clashing colors or patterns)
3. well (in fashion, expensive 
suits)
4. eccentric
B. Cleanliness
1. neutral
2. obsessively clean/neat
3. dirty/unkempt
C. Physique
1. neutral
2. attractive
3. overweight
4. awkward/geeky
5. deformed
VI. Type of Scientist
A. Physical Scientist
1. physicist
2. chemist
B. Biological Scientist
1. plant/animal
2. geneticist
3. ecological
4. paleontologist
C. Social Scientist
1. sociologist
2. anthropologist
3. research psychologists
4. archeologist
D. Mathematician
E. Medical doctor
1. type
F. Computer Scientist
G. Technologist
1. inventor
2. engineer
3. other (specify)
H. unknown physical or biological
I. unknown social scientist
J. unknown
VII. institutional affiliation
A. Research Institute
B. Government Agency
C. Military
D. College/University
E. Business
F. None
G. Museum
H. Unknown
VIII.Types of Research Conducted
A. library Research
B. lab work
C. interviews
D. other
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III.  Scientists Role within Film Name of Scientist:
I. First View of scientist (description)
II. Point at which scientist is disclosed as 
scientist to audience
III. Method of disclosure
A. direct mention
B. indirect assumption
1. dress
2. location
3. knowledge
4. actions
IV. Centrality
A. main character
B. supporting character (not primary 
character but is seen multiple 
times)
C. secondary character (appears 
alone but for short time)
D. member of large group
V. Role in plot
A. protagonist
B. antagonist
C. neither
D. adjunct to protagonist
E. adjunct to antagonist
VI. Relationship of character to protagonist
A. direct relationship
1. friend
2. rival
3. co-worker
4. supervisor
5. consultant 
a. requested by 
protagonist
b. requested by opposition
6. relative (specify)
7. none
B. attributes of relationship
1. emotionally attached
2. cordial
3. combative
4. neutral
VII. Continuity of character's position
A. No Change
B. character starts out against 
protagonist changes to
1. side of protagonist
2. side of protagonist and 
switches back
3. third position
C. character starts out with 
protagonist changes to
1. side against protagonist
2. against protagonist and 
switches back
3. third position
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VIII.Intended Effect of Scientific work
A. none
B. positive benefit (saves lives, kills 
monster)
C. negative consequences  (kills 
people, harms environment, 
destroys property)
D. knowledge
IX. Actual Effect of Scientific work
A. none
B. positive benefit (saves lives, kills 
monster)
C. negative consequences (kills 
people, harms environment, 
destroys property)
D. knowledge
X. Scientific Discussions (# of incidents)
A. discuss ethics
B. discuss methodology
C. discuss conflicts between science 
and values
D. value of research
E. purpose of research
XI. Scientific Dilemmas implied
XII. Importance of role as scientist
A. central to character's function
B. secondary to character's function
C. mostly irrelevant to character's  
function
XIII. Function of character within plot
XIV. Nature of Research (brief description) 
IV.  Personality Characteristics for Scientist:  Initial Evaluation
Name of Scientist:
coding 1:  all of the time, 2:  most of the time, 3:  about half of the time, 4: once or twice, 5:  never, 
N/A:  not applicable
Negative Types
Absent Minded 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(misplaces things, forgets names, loses belongings)
Socially Inept 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(awkward physically, makes inappropriate statements, poor conversationalist, cuts others off in 
conversation)
Detached from society 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(doesn't make conversation, ignores social greetings, apparently has few or no close friends)
Science Focused I 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(ignores social conventions in pursuit of science)
Science Focused II 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(ignores safety in pursuit of science)
Egotistical/Arrogant 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(insists on own interpretation, ignores input of others)
Power Hungry 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(harms others to gain power and position)
Emotionally detached 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(has little affect, may directly eschew emotional displays)
Foolhardy 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(makes choices that are dangerous to self or others without concern or without realizing)
Angry 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(subject to angry emotional outbursts)
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Cowardly 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(runs away from danger when could help, )
Greedy 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(wants more money or material goods)
Indecisive 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(finds it difficult to make decisions, hesitates prior to acting)
Positive/Neutral Types
Compassionate 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(concerned with emotional and physical well being of others)
Kindly 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(goes out of way to assist with problems of others)
Heroic 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(consistently behaves in ways that help others to possible detriment of self)
Decisive 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(makes decisions easily, acts immediately when necessary)
Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(no extreme positive or negative characteristics)
I. Behaviors with positive consequences (count of incidents)
A. altruistic behaviors
B. heroic behaviors
II. Behaviors with negative consequences (count of incidents)
A. harmed another individual
B. killed another individual
C. destroyed property
II. Change in Personality Habits due to
A. personal crisis
B. scientific crisis
C. external event
D. influence of other individual
E. other
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IV.  Personality Characteristics for Scientist:  Post Change Name of 
Scientist:
coding 1:  all of the time, 2:  most of the time, 3:  about half of the time, 4: once or twice, 5:  never, 
N/A:  not applicable
Negative Types
Absent Minded 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(misplaces things, forgets names, loses belongings)
Socially Inept 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(awkward physically, makes inappropriate statements, poor conversationalist, cuts others off in 
conversation)
Detached from society 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(doesn't make conversation, ignores social greetings, apparently has few or no close friends)
Science Focused I 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(ignores social conventions in pursuit of science)
Science Focused II 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(ignores safety in pursuit of science)
Egotistical/Arrogant 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(insists on own interpretation, ignores input of others)
Power Hungry 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(harms others to gain power and position)
Emotionally detached 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(has little affect, may directly eschew emotional displays)
Foolhardy 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(makes choices that are dangerous to self or others without concern or without realizing)
Angry 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(subject to angry emotional outbursts)
Cowardly 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(runs away from danger when could help, )
Greedy 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(wants more money or material goods)
Indecisive 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(finds it difficult to make decisions, hesitates prior to acting)
Positive/Neutral Types
Compassionate 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(concerned with emotional and physical well being of others)
Kindly 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(goes out of way to assist with problems of others)
Heroic 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(consistently behaves in ways that help others to possible detriment of self)
Decisive 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(makes decisions easily, acts immediately when necessary)
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Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 N/A
(no extreme positive or negative characteristics)
I. After Change:  Behaviors with positive (count of incidents)
A. altruistic behaviors
B. heroic behaviors
II. After Change:  Behaviors with negative consequences (count of incidents)
A. harmed another individual
B. killed another individual
C. destroyed property
V. Attitude of Main or Supporting Characters Toward Scientist    
Name: 
I.  Centrality
A. main character
B. supporting character (not primary 
character but is seen multiple 
times)
C. secondary character (appears 
alone but for short time)
D. member of large group
II. Role in plot
A. protagonist
B. antagonist
C. neither
D. adjunct to protagonist
E. adjunct to antagonist
III. Age
A. in school (graduate or 
undergraduate student),
B. young (20s, just out of school), 
C. mid-career (30s, 40s, established 
but not senior), 
D. late career (50s and older or well 
established).  
Note:  If age can be separated from 
status each will be coded 
separately.  If career and apparent 
age contradict these categories 
both will be coded.
IV. Sex
A. M
B. F
V race/ethnicity (multiple may apply)
A. black
B. white
C. Hispanic
D. Asian
1. Indian
2. Japanese
3. Chinese
4. Other
E. European
F. Soviet Block
G. non-human
VI. Character's role in Movie
A. function of character in plot (brief 
summary)
B. relationship to scientist
1. friend
2. employer
3. acquaintance
4. stranger
5. relative (specify)
6. enemy
VII. General attitude toward scientist 
A. antagonistic
B. friendly
C. neutral
139
VIII.Negative Actions by character against 
scientist
A. type of action
1. killed 
2. attempt to kill
3. court trial
4. jailed
5. loss of job
6. physically abused
7. maimed
8. verbally abused or denigrated
a. in person
b. to another
LI. Positive actions by character towards 
scientist
A. character acted against (name)
B. type of action
1. solved problem
2. saved life
3. gave material assistance
4. gave emotional support
.
Also Coded for categories II and III:  at the time of action does character know the person is a 
scientist.  Each action will be coded separately with a one or zero for this category
VI. Secondary Characters (small roles and group scenes)
Name or Description:
I. type of character 
A. group
B. passing stranger 
1. specific type recorder (e.g. 
waitress, co-worker)
II. function in plot (brief summary)
III. attitude toward scientist
A. strong emotional attachment
B. antagonistic
C. friendly
D. neutral
LV. Actions by others against scientist
A. character committing act (name)
B. type of action
1. killed 
2. attempt to kill
3. court trial
4. jailed
5. loss of job
6. physically abused
7. maimed
8. verbally abused or denigrated
a. in person
b. to another
LVI. Positive actions of 
other characters 
towards other scientist
A. character acted against (name)
B. type of action
1. solved problem
2. saved life
3. gave material assistance
4. gave emotional support
Also Coded for categories IV and IV: at the time of action does character know the person is a
scientist.  Each action will be coded separately with a one or zero for this category.
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APPENDIX  B
PRO-SCIENCE DISTRIBUTION A: COMPARISON OF SELF
AND OTHER EVALUATION OF UNDERSTANDING OF DNA
Including Trained Rater's Assessment (G2BS):
The trained rater's assessment of the respondents understanding of DNA  does 
not change the model significantly (see the final model below), but reduces the 
cases from 1005 to 795 and excludes people unsure of their own knowledge. 
Linear regression                               Number of obs =     795
                                                F( 19,   775) =   20.41
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                R-squared     =  0.3185
                                                Root MSE      =  .48144
------------------------------------------------------------------
       |               Robust
 mfs1a |     Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------+----------------------------------------------------------
SMEDUC |  .0150487   .0039852     3.78   0.000     .0072256    .0228717
  G2Ar | -.088648    .0367821    -2.41   0.016    -.1608525   -.0164436
CorSum |  .010406    .0073565     1.41   0.158     -.004035     .024847
    P7 | -.0637225   .0206175    -3.09   0.002    -.1041953   -.0232496
   H10 |  .0480054   .0171983     2.79   0.005     .0142445    .0817662
  MICE |  .0604242   .0191873     3.15   0.002      .022759    .0980893
    H3 | -.0723278   .0179705    -4.02   0.000    -.1076045   -.0370511
    H9 | -.1084942   .0205174    -5.29   0.000    -.1487705   -.0682178
   H15 | -.0811278   .0170974    -4.75   0.000    -.1146905   -.0475651
    A6 |  .0663921   .0303666     2.19   0.029     .0067815    .1260026
    J4 |  .0437757   .0149544     2.93   0.004     .0144198    .0731315
    K2 |  .1431939   .0406692     3.52   0.000      .063359    .2230287
   P12 |  .0939167   .0175269     5.36   0.000     .0595108    .1283226
   H16 |  .0279982   .0140051     2.00   0.046     .0005057    .0554907
    L1 |  .0625171   .0265474     2.35   0.019     .0104037    .1146304
    L2 | -.0665601   .0210671    -3.16   0.002    -.1079155   -.0252048
    L3 |  .0654154    .020672     3.16   0.002     .0248358    .1059951
    L9 |  .0756656   .0174847     4.33   0.000     .0413426    .1099886
  G2BS |  .0095684    .015818     0.60   0.545    -.0214829    .0406196
 _cons | -2.128064   .3188778    -6.67   0.000    -2.754031   -1.502098
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Final Model:
Linear regression                               Number of obs =    1005
                                                F( 18,   986) =   23.60
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                R-squared     =  0.3114
                                                Root MSE      =  .48803
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
        |               Robust
  mfs1a |      Coef.  Std. Err.     t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
--------+---------------------------------------------------------
 SMEDUC |   .0142096   .0037366     3.80   0.000   .0068771    .0215422
   G2Ar |  -.0511995   .0256911    -1.99   0.047  -.1016149   -.000784
 CorSum |   .0148023   .0060878     2.43   0.015   .0028557    .0267489
     P7 |  -.0654346   .0175271    -3.73   0.000  -.0998293   -.0310399
    H10 |   .0531803   .0153554     3.46   0.001   .0230474    .0833133
   MICE |   .0828638    .017306     4.79   0.000   .0489029    .1168247
     H3 |  -.0574769   .0157774    -3.64   0.000  -.088438    -.0265157
     H9 |  -.1078643   .0175437    -6.15   0.000  -.1422915   -.073437
    H15 |  -.0962657   .0156814    -6.14   0.000  -.1270385   -.065493
     A6 |   .0693147   .0261325     2.65   0.008   .0180329    .1205965
     J4 |   .039771    .0133636     2.98   0.003   .0135465    .0659954
     K2 |   .1140665   .0366737     3.11   0.002   .0420991    .1860339
    P12 |   .0874905   .0163069     5.37   0.000   .0554901    .1194908
    H16 |   .0302981   .0128446     2.36   0.019   .0050922     .055504
     L1 |   .0531461   .0204782     2.60   0.010   .0129602    .0933319
     L2 |  -.0558335    .018536    -3.01   0.003  -.092208   -.0194589
     L3 |   .0529282   .0183092     2.89   0.004   .0169986    .0888577
     L9 |   .068649    .0156226     4.39   0.000   .0379916    .0993064
  _cons |  -2.136424   .2715162    -7.87   0.000   -2.66924   -1.603608
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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APPENDIX  C
NSF SURVEY KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS IN CORSUM
M1: The center of the Earth is very hot. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M2: All radioactivity is man-made. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M3: The oxygen we breathe comes
from plants. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M4:It is the father’s gene that decides
whether the baby is a boy or a girl. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M5: Lasers work by focusing sound
waves. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M6: Electrons are smaller than atoms. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M7: Antibiotics kill viruses as well as
bacteria. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M8: The universe began with a huge
explosion.  Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false
 
M9: The continents on which we live
have been moving their location for
millions of years and will 
continue to move in the future. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M10: Human beings, as we know them
today, developed from earlier species
of animals. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M11: Cigarette smoking causes lung
cancer. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M12: The earliest humans lived at the
same time as the dinosaurs. 
Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
M13: Radioactive milk can be made
safe by boiling it. 
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Is that true or false? 
1> true 
2> false 
N1: Which travels faster: light or
sound? 
1> light 
2> sound 
2> both the same 
N2: Does the Earth go around the Sun,
or does the Sun go around the Earth? 
1> Earth goes around Sun 
2> Sun goes around Earth
N3:  Ask if N2 = 1 
How long does it take for the Earth to
go around the Sun: one day, one
month, or one year? 
1> one day 
2> one month 
3> one year 
4> DO NOT READ: other time period 
Now, think about this situation. A
doctor tells a couple that their genetic
makeup means that they’ve got one in
four chances of having a child with an
inherited illness. 
O1: Does this mean that if their first
three children are healthy, the fourth
will have the illness? 
1> Yes/True 
2> No/False 
O2: Does this mean that if their first
child has the illness, the next three will
not? 
1> Yes/True 
2> No/False 
O3: Does this mean that each of the
couple’s children will have the same
risk of suffering from the 
illness? 
1> Yes/True 
2> No/False 
O4: Does this mean that if they have
only three children, none will have the
illness? 
1> Yes/True 
2> No/False 
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APPENDIX  D
PRO-SCIENCE DISTRIBUTION A: COMPARISON OF
PARENTS WISHES REGARDING SCIENCE FOR MALE AND
FEMALE CHILDREN
SUBSTITUTING FEMALE FOR MALE
Changing from how someone would feel about their son becoming a scientist 
(K2) to how they feel about their daughter (K1) has very little effect on the model 
(see below for the final model). 
Linear regression                               Number of obs =    1571
                                                F( 18,  1552) =   53.60
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                R-squared     =  0.3582
                                                Root MSE      =  .72349
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
       |               Robust
  mfs1 |     Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------+---------------------------------------------------------------
SMEDUC |  .0122175   .0044261     2.76   0.006     .0035357    .0208993
  G2Ar | -.0098588   .0312049    -0.32   0.752     -.071067    .0513494
CorSum |  .0439655   .0068956     6.38   0.000     .0304399    .0574911
    P7 | -.1265248    .021257    -5.95   0.000    -.1682202   -.0848294
   H10 |  .0941037   .0184966     5.09   0.000     .0578228    .1303846
  MICE |  .1414998   .0193731     7.30   0.000     .1034995       .1795
    H3 | -.0666343   .0180764    -3.69   0.000    -.1020911   -.0311776
    H9 | -.1346326   .0213132    -6.32   0.000    -.1764384   -.0928269
   H15 | -.1328761   .0203527    -6.53   0.000    -.1727979   -.0929543
    A6 |  .1610693   .0306109     5.26   0.000     .1010262    .2211123
    J4 |  .0757995   .0173247     4.38   0.000     .0418172    .1097818
    K1 |  .0998532   .0433948     2.30   0.022     .0147346    .1849717
   P12 |  .1562834   .0197902     7.90   0.000      .117465    .1951019
   H16 |  .0620442    .014481     4.28   0.000       .03364    .0904485
    L1 |  .0341903    .023457     1.46   0.145    -.0118205    .0802011
    L2 | -.0692835   .0213744    -3.24   0.001    -.1112093   -.0273577
    L3 |   .105556   .0219903     4.80   0.000     .0624222    .1486899
    L9 |   .093947   .0193778     4.85   0.000     .0559375    .1319564
 _cons | -3.367151   .3166125   -10.63   0.000    -3.988184   -2.746117
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Final Model:
Linear regression                               Number of obs =    1005
                                                F( 18,   986) =   23.60
                                                Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                R-squared     =  0.3114
                                                Root MSE      =  .48803
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
        |               Robust
  mfs1a |      Coef.  Std. Err.     t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
--------+---------------------------------------------------------
 SMEDUC |   .0142096   .0037366     3.80   0.000   .0068771    .0215422
   G2Ar |  -.0511995   .0256911    -1.99   0.047  -.1016149   -.000784
 CorSum |   .0148023   .0060878     2.43   0.015   .0028557    .0267489
     P7 |  -.0654346   .0175271    -3.73   0.000  -.0998293   -.0310399
    H10 |   .0531803   .0153554     3.46   0.001   .0230474    .0833133
   MICE |   .0828638    .017306     4.79   0.000   .0489029    .1168247
     H3 |  -.0574769   .0157774    -3.64   0.000  -.088438    -.0265157
     H9 |  -.1078643   .0175437    -6.15   0.000  -.1422915   -.073437
    H15 |  -.0962657   .0156814    -6.14   0.000  -.1270385   -.065493
     A6 |   .0693147   .0261325     2.65   0.008   .0180329    .1205965
     J4 |   .039771    .0133636     2.98   0.003   .0135465    .0659954
     K2 |   .1140665   .0366737     3.11   0.002   .0420991    .1860339
    P12 |   .0874905   .0163069     5.37   0.000   .0554901    .1194908
    H16 |   .0302981   .0128446     2.36   0.019   .0050922     .055504
     L1 |   .0531461   .0204782     2.60   0.010   .0129602    .0933319
     L2 |  -.0558335    .018536    -3.01   0.003  -.092208   -.0194589
     L3 |   .0529282   .0183092     2.89   0.004   .0169986    .0888577
     L9 |   .068649    .0156226     4.39   0.000   .0379916    .0993064
  _cons |  -2.136424   .2715162    -7.87   0.000   -2.66924   -1.603608
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
146
APPENDIX  E
NORMALITY OF THE PRO-SCIENCE FACTOR SCORE
DISTRIBUTIONS
Distribution A (lower pro-science scores) is not fully normal, it is clearly 
skewed left (skewness -0.74) and the peak of the distribution is a bit too high 
(kurtosis 2.9), but is reasonably close enough that no transformation of the 
distribution to a more normal form gave improved regression results. 
Distribution B (higher pro-science scores) is much closer to normal (skewness 
0.08 kurtosis 2.4) and also did not transform in any way to improve the the 
regression results. The error terms for distribution A do not have common 
variance so the robust option was used to relax the assumption of independence 
in error terms which will resolve the issue of this heteroskedasticity. The 
functional form of the model was examined using component-plus-residual plots 
for all independent variables and was found to be sufficiently close to linear in 
alignment with the assumptions of linear regression.
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APPENDIX  F
NORMALITY OF THE ANTI-SCIENCE FACTOR SCORE
The distribution anti-science factor scores is not quite normal. It is slightly 
skewed left (skewness  -0.55) and the peak of the distribution is a bit too high 
(kurtosis  4.8). Several transformations to make the distribution closer to normal,
including a Box-Cox transformation, were attempted, but were unsuitable for this
data. No transformations provided an improvement in the model. The error 
terms  do not have common variance so the robust option was used to relax the 
assumption of independence in error terms which will resolve the issue of this 
heteroskedasticity. To ensure that the the data was linear, as is the assumption 
for multivariate regression, the functional form was examined using component-
plus-residual plots for all independent variables and was found to be sufficiently 
close to linear.
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